A question about blockchain governance. My friend debates that Decred suffers from "tyranny by the majority". When the majority decides to approve a design-decision, it marginalizes the minority that doesn't want it.
Wouldn't that put Decred at risk of what blockchain governance was supposed to prevent, a hard fork by the minority?
At Decred, who has most skin in the game has the most voting power and not necessarily the majority.
And this is very good in a company or entity, as we know that most people are dumb while those who have the most to lose will think hard about decisions.
That's part of my point. If Decred was like Bitcoin, it would then be possible for a scenario which the richest merchants, miners/NYA, which was the minority, "won", and got their 2X fork.
In any case, Decred's hybrid mining system, where POS confirms the POW blocks, was designed to make a hardfork like ETH and bitcoin impossible without community consensus.
If POW miners attempt a hardfork without consensus, ticket owners will decline and it will not happen and vice versa.
A hardfork in decred only happens if there is consensus between POW miners and ticket owners (POS).
https://blog.decred.org/2018/10/15/Politeia-in-Production/I'm asking about a contentious hard fork, that deliberately splits the chain.
In case of a hard fork voting, the decred code does not allow the existence of 2 blockchains. The "defeated" blockchain "dies".
Hard fork happens automatically and takes everyone in the same direction.
It is impossible for a group to continue on the old blockchain and keep it alive.
It's impossible to happen at Decred what happened to ETH and BTC.
The devs took great care in developing this.
It is one of the main differentials of decred.