well..
most people dont carry around a desktop computer when wanting to use remote/someone elses internet. so usually people are checking via a smart phone by default when they go visit someones house. so chances that the victim is using a lite wallet being very very high without attacker even having to try
Agreed. most people dont carry around a desktop computer when wanting to use remote/someone elses internet. so usually people are checking via a smart phone by default when they go visit someones house. so chances that the victim is using a lite wallet being very very high without attacker even having to try
. . . So should the attacker be certain his victim only uses a lite wallet he can invite his victim to his home to receive the payment? . . .
You are changing the rules here. You said that you were thinking about Bitcoin-Qt BECAUSE it is usually perceived as a better solution than any light wallet. Now you are saying that the victim is going to use a worse solution?
And another thought. What if the attacker performs the same attack without inviting his victim to a physical place, just by knowing the victims IP and isolating from him the right net and offering only connections to the fake nodes?
Place has nothing to do with the attack you are trying to describe. The point of your described attack is simply that the victim is isolated from other Bitcoin nodes and is forced to communicate with nodes that the attack controls. There may be MANY different ways to accomplish this, but in the end it isn't likely to be a profitable attack unless you have a VERY VERY gullible victim.
Seems like performing this kind of attack against a lite wallet is much easier, right?