I am looking at Armory's code to see how the wallet secret key is generated. This is what I saw so far:

PyBtcWallet -> SecureBinaryData -> (Crypto++) AutoSeededX917RNG -> ... bunch of code ... -> /dev/urandom

Now, I don't want to go into the discussion about /dev/random vs. /dev/urandom. The problem is that for bitcoin holding purposes, I actually don't trust /dev/random nor /dev/urandom. It might happen that their implementation in my kernel is silently broken (see Android's case). Or that my machine happens to be low on entropy just as I am about to create a wallet. Since Armory is all about deterministic wallets created with a single master key, it is super-important that this key is generated properly. Randomness in Armory is mission critical. Bad randomness could sweep cold storage coins behind my back.

I am proposing that Armory will use it's own random number generator. Preferably something similar to TrueCrypt's RNG (http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/random-number-generator#Y266). /dev/(u)random, time measurements and mouse movements will be continuously mixed into an entropy pool. Random numbers can then extracted from the pool. When creating a new wallet, Armory will mix mouse movements into the pool for at least 10 seconds before generating the master key. Even bitaddress does this.

I actually really like all the features in Armory - cold storage/offline transactions, deterministic wallets, N-out-of-M backups, etc. But it really saddens me to see its most critical security feature broken like this. I would love to use Armory for storing my coins. But the not-good-enough RNG makes me eery.