I am not saying Armory isn't secure. I am saying the security of Armory == the security of the underlying /dev/random. Which is not terribly bad, but not terribly good either if you are paranoid as me.

Here is a possible attack on Armory. I sell you a laptop. I think you might install Armory on it. I subvert /dev/random to generate bad random numbers (an extreme way would be to point /dev/random to /dev/zero, but I would probably do something way less obvious). You get the laptop and install Armory (you even verify the signature after downloading!). You fund your wallet. I search through the much smaller key space and steal your funds. The laptop could have been offline the whole time. And it did not matter that Armory needed only 32 bytes. (Of course, if you reinstall the OS my attack would not work. I am counting that you won't).

FIPS assumes that you have a secure entropy source. What FIPS really does is specify algorithms that could stretch an original short random seed into a long stream of pseudo-randomness. But if the entropy source is not secure the assumption is invalidated and FIPS will be broken.

Is there a way to use my own entropy (cards, cubes) with Armory? I didn't see this feature.