Good source, thank you.
I did find some parts in that discussion quite interesting. For example, here is a quote from one of the replies:
Some exit relays are considered as bad exits. They might listen in your traffic, change your traffic etc. Tor does not choose them (as long as you don't explicitly allow it).
How would TOR know that some exit nodes are "bad" and have ways to monitor or manipulate the traffic routed through them? And if they have such knowledge, why are those nodes not removed and blacklisted?
I find this segment interesting as well:
Operators who run more than one relay should declare those relays their 'family' (There is a special option in the configuration). Tor doesn't choose more then one relay from a family.
The emphasis is on "
should". They didn't say "
must" or "
have to", but you have the option to do it or not.
Nothing of the above seems worrying to me either, but still interesting to think about...