Some printers have features that do not work well with printing confidential information.
So don't use a printer at all, or only use it to print out information which is not a security risk, such as your addresses, xpubs, or QR codes of the same. Write down the seed phrase instead.
For example, when you generate your private keys, you must rely upon the RNG of your OS.
So create entropy manually by flipping a coin.
If you are creating a paper wallet, you must expose your private key to any "eyes" (including cameras) that can see in the room you are in.
So close the curtains, put some tape over your laptop camera, and leave your phone in another room.
While you are storing your paper wallet, if someone is able to access your paper wallet, they can ~instantly make a copy of the paper wallet with a camera.
So use one or more passphrases.
All of these supposed "weaknesses" of paper wallets are weaknesses of every wallet which you back up your seed phrase on paper. By creating a wallet, backing it up on paper, and then destroying the electronic copy, then I am only removing some vectors of attack.