Let's say the miners following the rules own 70% of the total hash rate. Miners who own the other 30% are located in sanctioned countries and don't join the 70%.
What do you expect to happen? Will they stop mining? Or there will be a hard fork and they will create a separate a chain?
Assuming this scenario: They can hard fork all they want, but their fork won't be accepted in any country that enforces sanctions. So there's no point in creating the fork.
It is more complicated than that. We aren't talking about an arbitrary fork or a damaging change. We are talking about a fixing change.
If we ignore the propaganda article shared by OP and focus on the underlying issue we can see that the main arguments are about one of the main principles of bitcoin which is being
censorship resistant. I'd argue that if a large number of miners started maliciously rejecting certain transactions then this principle is at risk and the community has to react. Meaning even if 70% or more of the hashrate was malicious we still would move ahead with a hard fork that addresses this. Possibly an algorithm change the bricks their ASICs worth millions of dollars (if my math is right, that's 8.3 million ASICs).