Wasabi coordinator doesn't know anything that isn't known by the public. A chain analysis can trace the coins as they're all connected in a single transaction; it only obfuscates the final outcome. What zkSNACKs did in the recent update, is to blacklist certain outputs from being mixed, making therefore chain analysis easier.
Actually, a CoinJoin coordinator knows more than the public, and that "knowledge," if shared with blockchain surveillance firms, law enforcement agencies, or government, can definitely harm users. You are connecting to a coordinator through Tor, so it won't know your real IP address. That is not a problem. However, the problem is that all the inputs that you share with a coordinator will come from a single Tor identity, and a ordinator will learn that certain inputs belong to the same user. Inputs may not be connected to each other on the blockchain (publicly available information) but can be linked to each other during input consolidation (information unknown to the public). For instance, if one of your inputs is KYCed (tied to real identity) and the others are in a blacklist, then a coordinator or blockchain surveillance firm will learn to whom blacklisted coins belong.