You make it sound so simple like flipping a switch and it's all taken care of. They don't even know what signature scheme they would use.
Why would we? A credible threat from quantum computing is decades away. Why would we discuss and settle on a quantum resistant algorithm now, knowing that when it comes to actually be necessary the algorithm we chose today will almost certainly be long outdated and replaced by something stronger, quicker, more efficient, etc?
No it doesn't. It just means you only use your bitcoin address one time.
And as soon as broadcast a transaction from that address, then your public key is exposed, allowing a malicious miner with a quantum computer to steal your coins. So again, if your security relies on keeping your public key private, then your security is broken.
It's not that it relies on it but given the choice, I prefer not to let anyone know my public key or keys. I feel more secure that way. Luckily bitcoin allows that by simply not re-using the same address more than once.
That's absolutely fine if that's what you want to do, and everyone should be avoiding address re-use anyway from a privacy point of view. But it is not a viable solution against quantum attacks.
I think there's logistical issues in doing something like that though. Are you just going to fork bitcoin? And the old legacy chain dies off? What happens to Satoshi's bitcoin?
The old chain doesn't die, we simply introduce a new quantum resistant address type. We've introduced many new address types over the course of bitcoin's history, such as segwit and now taproot, with no effect on previous blocks.
I think 128 bits of security is on the fence.
At 200 exahash, it would take the entire bitcoin network about 54 billion years to perform 2
128 hashes. And that's just simple hashes using highly efficient ASICs. Worth mentioning that if you think 128 bits is insecure, not only should you stop using bitcoin, but you probably need to stop using banks or even the internet and just keep all your money in cash under your mattress.