Without thinking carefully you might think that sometimes underpaying would still be better than zero subsidy but that isn't clear to me because unpredictability in security is itself a problem because it interferes with compensating behaviors.
But with zero tail emission, is security not inherently unpredictable since it depends solely on the fee market at the time? We may still have periods of over security, with mempools packed with transactions paying high fee rates, and periods of under security, with empty mempools with a handful of low fee transactions.
So, no hard forks are really needed to create a tail supply, you can instead force all users to pay a "tail supply fee", for example one satoshi per each 0.01 BTC.
All addresses? Or all transactions? If it's the former then it breaks things like timelocked transactions and Lightning by meaning that pre-signed transactions would no longer be valid since the value of the inputs is now lower than that of the outputs.