Re: WasabiWallet.io | Open-source, non-custodial Bitcoin Wallet for desktop
If I have .0007 and .0004 but Whirlpool requires a .001 standard denomination, then I must consolidate these inputs in tx0, revealing they are owned by the same wallet. This also creates .0001 in leftovers that can continue to be traced to future transactions.
Lol, what? So it's Samourai's fault if users consolidate inputs together even before they go anywhere near Whirlpool in the first place?Yes, it is Samourai's fault: They sacrifice your privacy (as well as block space/transaction fees) by forcing you to do a tx0 transaction before coinjoining, which requires non private consolidation such as with the example transaction I provided above where neither input can register for the minimum pool by itself. Even if you have more coins than the minimum pool size, Samourai has designed their coordinator fee to incentivize the biggest possible input consolidations since you pay a fixed pool entry fee to the coordinator instead of an amount based entry fee.
Since you can't spend this leftover amount anyway, why not just add it to the mining fee?
You can absolutely spend it. If it's large enough, coinjoin it in a smaller denomination pool.Please refer to my example, there is no smaller pool than .001 BTC, and the leftover output is worth .0001 (minus tx and pool fees ofc).
If it's too small for that, swap it for Monero or for Lightning. Easy peasy.
You know what's even easier than that? A coinjoin making all of your Bitcoins private like Wasabi does without extra steps, extra layers, or extra shitcoins.
How is it nonsense? Since the Samourai and Sparrow clients don't use Tor or a full node by default, it causes all of the users with default wallet setups to unknowingly participate in sybil attacks against any Whirlpool users that change all of the default settings to prevent their IP address and xpub address from being leaked.
That's not what you said. You said that Whirpool doesn't provide "any anonymity at all", which is clearly false.
You're lying, and everyone can see you are lying - Here's the exact quote of what I said: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62067607#msg62067607
Additionally, since you are coinjoining with users who have leaked their IP address or xpub address, it's unlikely a Whirlpool coinjoin round ever gains any anonymity at all.
If I'm wrong, show everyone proof that the clients used by all 5 inputs and outputs in this Whirlpool transaction are using Tor and their own node instead of sending someone else's node their xpub: https://mempool.space/tx/e3064be77edcf00d986b7c5116ad3a9b602623d4c0f940a68b9752bd450eaeac
Wasabi enforces privacy by default with Tor and client side block filters, preventing any IP addresses or xpub addresses from being leaked by honest users, even by accident.
But hands all your addresses and UTXOs directly to a blockchain analysis company. 
This is a lie, all of your addresses and UTXOs are prevented from being linked to each other by blockchain analysis because Wasabi uses client side block filters to discover your wallet balance from the network.
This blockchain analysis would only be possible in Samourai wallet and Sparrow wallet since all of your previously used addresses and future unused Bitcoin addresses are sent to a third party server by default, even your equal value outputs from coinjoins.
Of course I'm ignoring it because it's a stupid point, everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:
Right. So address reuse is stupid, but when Wasabi reuses addresses, that's ok?No, it's not okay, which is why exactly Wasabi generates a new receive address for every transaction. Please see read the Wasabi docs:
https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/why-wasabi/Coins.html#address-reuse
https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/using-wasabi/Receive.html#the-problem-with-address-reuse
If this (output) received absolutely no privacy then, prove it. Tell everyone which input(s) belong to its owner: https://mempool.space/address/bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru
I really don't think you want to play the "cherry pick individual transactions" game, but since you started it, then how about this one: https://mempool.space/tx/dae13b2d015587a3033d7ab7949a7efa6d6ed7aa782168b0651ab37a2d8390f8There is exactly one input which could have created the 6.46652537 BTC output. Zero privacy gained.
That 6.46652537 BTC output is then coinjoined a second time with Wasabi, and again, there is an output of 4.39250624 BTC which could only have come from that input. Zero privacy gained.
Great job Wasabi!
So for the record: You were not able to identify the input that created an output without other matching values in address bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru which proves your previous claim of "you don't need to be a "whale" at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin" to be false.