Re: WasabiWallet.io | Open-source, non-custodial Bitcoin Wallet for desktop
⭐ Merited by vapourminer (1)
Post the tx ID of any Whirlpool transaction and I will show you the tx0 transaction that was created by each of the new entrants.
Ok, here's one: https://mempool.space/tx/ed3131b544fbf00a71709942e483b55e629312ecb181e6e819409f419ee0d226Where exactly is the privacy loss for new entrants, splitting a single UTXO in to multiple UTXOs to join the pool?
Why would you assume it is likely that most users would change all their default settings in their wallet that are required to become private?... Since Whirlpool coinjoins are only 5 inputs, 4 users who used the default settings will automatically deanonymize the remaining user who customized his settings to turn his client private.
Why would you assume users interested in privacy would not be running their own node? And even if all 4 are leaking the xpubs, I can just leave my UTXOs in the pool for unlimited free remixes.This is, once again, why WabiSabi coinjoins are strictly superior to Whirlpool coinjoins since you don't have to worry about honest users being used as unknowing and unwilling spies against you.
You can instead just rest safe in the knowledge that your coordinator is willingly being used to spy against you, and you are paying for the privilege. Lol.Again, this is a lie: No one knows that addresses and UTXOs belong to any single user because Wasabi masks this information with client side block filters and Tor by default.
Cool, I never said that. What I said that Wasabi "hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to a blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval."There's nothing you can do to stop someone from sending two transactions to the same address.
Can you make up your mind? First you say Wasabi doesn't reuse addresses, but then it's not your fault when Wasabi does reuse addresses?Here's a lovely example of Wasabi reusing addresses, which led to the user in question being doxxed: https://nitter.it/ErgoBTC/status/1585671294783311872
The transaction you linked isn't even a WabiSabi coinjoin and doesn't have a 4.39250624 BTC output.
Perhaps try reading what I wrote again before just blurting out your sound bites.The transaction I linked has an output of 6.46652537 BTC which could only be created by a single input. This output of 6.46652537 BTC is then coinjoined with Wasabi a second time (in this transaction https://mempool.space/tx/568e6cc87909648c58487a95729d2ba21c011da635323ab7a21d281a03ca705c), creating a 4.39250624 BTC output which again couldn't have come from anywhere else. Two Wasabi coinjoins in a row, zero privacy gained.
You are just posting nonsense trying to distract from the fact I proved you wrong by posting a non whale non matching output that you were not able to trace: bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru
So your argument boils down to "I can show you some examples which cannot be deanonymized, therefore all your examples of Wasabi coinjoins failing spectacularly are moot". Seriously?Hey guys, only 5% of our cars randomly explode and kill the driver, so they are perfectly safe!
