That's a great way to mask the contents of a seed phrase, but is it really worth the risk of forgetting it?
Keep in mind that most people's hard drives are like museums with a bunch of old lost files and folders relegated to the archives section - where they are never viewed again - after someone opens them once or twice.
Decryption inevitably will store the seed somewhere in plaintext which makes any kind of encryption implementation vulnerable to side-channels (as almost everyone is running this through some 3rd party terminal or GUI).
Hi, the algorithm doesn't store the seed(as I said, there's no information in the crypto file). I don't actually find the vulnerability of side channels attack. I would appreciate if you can point out the vulnerability.
The side channel attack is not present in your algorithm directly, however it can be found indirectly inside the other software the end user is using to run your decryption algorithm inside and store the output. I mean: The terminal, text editor, the clipboard, the filesystem driver, those kind of things.