Plural you. You're a contributor, right? I presume you do have information about zkSNACKs. If you don't know, you can tell me.
I don't know what company(s) zkSNACKs uses.
But a coordinator is not a data analysis company. For zkSNACKs to verify that chain analysis gives false positives it has to either analyze the chain itself or pay another company to verify the chain analysis' positives.
A coordinator can still detect false positives in certain cases such as a previous coinjoin or Lightning channel output being flagged. In this event, the coordinator should prompt the chain analysis company for proof as to how they are certain these funds are owned by the accused (such as if the coinjoiner leaked their xpub address or IP address by using Samourai wallet or Sparrow wallet).
Since the former makes no sense, and (if) the coordinator pays no other companies, I assume it simply accepts the paid company's claims without questioning anything. Is that correct?
I would imagine if the paid company is going to accept liability, then I assume that would prevent the coordinator from circumventing their decisions.
If you don't expect your transaction data that you broadcast to everyone else's computer for permanent storage to be analyzed by anyone, you're just naive.
This is not what I said. I only said that I don't expect regular Bitcoin users to switch to full scrutiny entities. I only expect surveillance companies to do that, e.g. chain analysis companies.
Okay.
The solution to your problem of public transaction data exists already: WabiSabi coinjoins are purposely designed to make the data you broadcast useless to any analyzers.
Making transaction data useless to data analyzers after they have approved they don't mind, ergo that data is useless to them beforehand, doesn't seem like the solution to my problem.
No, it's not a solution to your specific problem, the solution to your specific problem is to simply use a different coordinator:
I've read most of the posts/replies towards Kruw, and I think that everyone is making too much commotion over nothing but a trade-off taken by a group of developers, who, believes that the best path forward for Wasabi Wallet is to make the centralized coordinator block outputs from nefarious sources. The solution, in my personal opinion is, fork the coordinator and have it accept all outputs from all sources.
Yep. Anyone who feels brave enough to copy and paste the coordinator code can do so. Others have already because they actually care about what they are saying:
https://t.me/WasabiWallet/70611Did you mean "doesn't this prevent already surveilled users from having their privacy established?"
Could be, but not necessarily. We frequently notice centralized exchanges (which have partnerships with chain analysis companies) to simply deny coins coming from mixers*. There is no excuse, there are just users who have had their privacy protected, ergo have not been surveilled, but were included in blacklists, simply because of the way tainting works; you either blacklist the entire set of unspent outputs coming from a mixer, because you can't figure out where's the "unethical money" so it's unethical to leave them unpunished, or you don't because you can't figure out where's the "ethical money" so it's unethical to punish innocents.
* to clarify, mixers that don't cooperate with chain analysis companies. I'd never expect to write this phrase as it's taken for granted, but here we are.I think that's why Lightning is so important: Exchanges will be forced to adopt privacy friendly deposits and withdrawals because they can't afford to transact on the nonprivate base layer forever.