Post
Topic
Board Wallet software
Re: WasabiWallet.io | Open-source, non-custodial Bitcoin Wallet for desktop
by
BlackHatCoiner
on 22/06/2023, 06:18:10 UTC
I've already explained that address reuse is bad for privacy, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper
Which is exactly my point. But you don't seem concerned with Wasabi doing address reuse in coinjoins according to all those people who argue it does.

The WabiSabi coinjoin protocol is uniquely resilient against the sort of Sybil attack you just described, I explain how a malicious coordinator can be detected by clients here: https://twitter.com/Kruwed/status/1643265823409143810
I think you're missing something here. Suppose the coordinator isn't trying to attack. What if Coinfirm does? According to Wasabi's source code, every non-private input must be authorized by Coinfirm. What if they someday decide to blacklist arbitrarily more than usual, to have their analysis ahead? They're a chain analysis company in the end. Their incentive is to de-anonymize the transactions, how can you trust them with a software that supposedly does the opposite?