Says the supporter of software which requires mass surveillance company's approval to have your coins mixed; which makes any coinjoin made my Wasabi objectively not trustless.

There is nothing preventing the third party from refusing any coin, and thus, from refusing a private coin.

Great. I can't verify myself I'm subjected to a Sybil attack chain analysis attack, so let's buy some private coins from someone who can neither verify he's being subjected same like. 

There is no malicious coordinator in my hypothetical scenario. There is a malicious third party (coinVerifier named in the source code), which can arbitrarily refuse to have some coins in the WabiSabi round. The third party can attempt to attack to my non-private coin by refusing to accept any other non-private coin, accept a small number of private coins, and fill the round with their coins. That would make it look as if it's a big coinjoin, but the third party will be able to de-anonymize it much more effectively.

In Wasabi, the coordinator initiates a request to a third party. Subsequently, the third party obtains the authority to approve or disapprove the coins participating in the coinjoin round. As a result, the entire coinjoin round hinges on the judgment of the third party. Could you explain to me how it makes sense for a coinjoin round to rely on a company that aims to de-anonymize coinjoins?