@AlcoHoDL, Trezor vulnerability is something that has been known for years, there was a lot of discussion about it in the technical discussion boards, but luckily every user can protect himself by setting a passphrase, and there is also another option, which is the use of an SD card.
When it comes to passphrase, the conclusion is that they should be at least 37 characters long :
A physical access to a Trezor One, Trezor T, Keepkey, or B-wallet allows an attacker to extract the 12/24-words within a few minutes using a low-cost setup (~100$), with a very high reproducibility (we had 100% success). We finally proved it can be fully automated allowing anyone to use it in case someone would sell the Extraktor box (similar to old Playstation hacks). This attack can not be fixed. The only mitigation is to use a strong passphrase: we recommend 37 random characters to maintain the same level of security.
For those who are interested in how to protect themselves additionally with the help of an SD card :
Trezor T (2.3.0) and Trezor One (1.9.0) firmware updateAlso, one thing I forgot is that it is possible to set a so-called fake PIN that can be left as a bait, and if it is entered, all data from the hardware wallet will be deleted.
The Wipe Code
Another exciting new feature is the wipe code that acts as a “self-destruct PIN” that erases your Trezor if someone tries to unlock your device without your consent. If the wipe code is entered into any PIN entry dialog, then all private data will be immediately erased from your Trezor and the device will be reset to factory defaults. You can write the wipe code somewhere near your Trezor as a decoy PIN, so if someone tries to unlock the device without your consent, they will cause it to erase itself. You can also use the wipe code to reset your Trezor without using a host device. This update can be enabled on both Trezor models.
A 128 bits PIN should do the trick as well, as it is used to encrypt the seed on the chip.