This is wrong. With WabiSabi, it isn't known how many inputs of a coinjoin you control. Since input consolidation is private, you could own 1 input, or your could own 10 inputs, there's no way to tell.
Knowing which inputs come from a particular transaction and which outputs are spent within a particular transaction worsens the anonymity set. For example, if you join a round with 250 inputs, including yours, and 240 of them are owned by the same entity, and around the same outputs (value-wise or not) are later on evidently owned by one entity, then it has clearly made it easier to de-anonymize the coinjoin.
Wasabi 2.0 is also caught at reusing addresses, which is really bad for obvious reasons:
https://kycp.org/#/0d832b9db303d4f5934c52a061af9c3c378f0243f8cbb8783d14a1d52e8cbdbbSparrow coinjoins can be tracked if postmix UTXOs are merged since you can link a single participant to multiple rounds
Why can't this happen with Wasabi again?
If you deposited to Coinbase you would have gained the same privacy from me, you trusting someone else with that information is not a solution.
No, I wouldn't, because it is trivial to de-anonymize Coinbase outputs. There is even a website that takes as input addresses and tells you to which exchange they belong;
https://www.walletexplorer.com/. It is well known these entities cooperate with blockchain analysis firms, and can de-anonymize your coins with just a phone call.
You would also obviously not hand over KYC to a mixer.