A blockchain analyst can't Sybil attack Wasabi's for free like they can with Whirlpool's coinjoins. In Whirlpool, Sybil attack victims pay the mining fees for Sybil attackers. In WabiSabi, Sybil attackers have to pay for their own mining fees.
You still have to pay to enter whirlpool and the anon set gets bigger over time.
The same post-mix practices are not "just as possible" when you use Wasabi because there is no peeling chain created by change and there is no common input ownership revealed.
Generating change outputs is inevitable when using Wasabi. There's no way that all participants have the same sized UTXOs. Eventually UTXOs get too small to coinjoin in wasabi and they become doxxic.
I have no doubt law enforcement will be happy to freeze his coins based anyways, but this suspicion is not based on conclusive proof since the spent UTXO accused of belonging to the attacker was created alongside 2 identical UTXOs with the same value in the coinjoin, making it merely a guess.
If chain analysis companies sybil attacked the Wasabi mix, then it's not just some guess. Additionally anyone else could could have sybil attacked the mix. UTXOs sizes are identical in any given whirlpool pool so I am not sure how Wasabi provides more privacy when only 2 other UTXOs are identical.
So what? When you merge inputs in a coinjoin, common ownership isn't revealed.
Once you enter whirlpool, common ownership is not revealed.
If you decide to generate change by making a payment outside of a coinjoin instead of inside of a coinjoin, you can just still just coinjoin the change instead of creating a peeling chain.
This is a user decision. The same can be said of Whirlpool. If you generate change, you can CoinJoin in a smaller pool. Once a UTXO gets small enough, it becomes too small to CoinJoin.
This thread has grown to become unmanageable for me. I am glad that you like Wasabi. I hope it is as private as you seem to think it is. I will revisit Wasabi and see if there is any value that I can get out of it.