They self sybil and fill Wasabi with fake volume. Very easy for them to link inputs and outputs.
Even if they do not sybil attack themselves, their
back-end unit tests reveal that they request input approval from a chain analysis company (probably Coinfirm). A company which have a
great incentive, I'll say, to execute a sybil attack.
I don't want to engage in Wasabi discussions since I think we've covered that arc and there isn't anything more to say, but even if Wasabi is not a honeypot and we ignore all the evidence of Wasabi being flawed software, it's just naive to put trust on people with principles that do not align with Bitcoin's.
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I think you've misread something. First things first, the links you've mentioned talk about the exit nodes (which are your "way out" to the clearnet). Wasabi utilizes hidden services, that means, no exit nodes intervene.