Personally, I combine toxic change with other toxic change where lack of privacy is minimum.
Why not use WabiSabi instead so you don't have toxic change and lose no privacy at all?
It has been said multiple times already that it allows you to consolidate them with a mix partner. At this point, you're just repeating the same soundbites. WabiSabi != Whirlpool, so yeah, it doesn't allow you to consolidate just as WabiSabi does.
You can't consolidate UTXOs in a Whirlpool coinjoin, there are always an equal amount of inputs and outputs.
No. The coordinator would simply refuse to work on a coinjoin where outputs contain addresses from inputs, just as you've programmed it to refuse "naughty" coins.
Having the coordinator ban Alice because Bob registered an output to her input address doesn't solve the DoS issue.
Nothing is provably revealed, in the sense that I can be 100% sure to ownership identification, just as if I send all of my coins to a single address, you can't tell if it was self-transfer or I spent them to a merchant. But, privacy is about possibilities, and input / output collaborations and merges only worsen uncertainty.
What possibilities were eliminated by the 262 input collaborators and 294 output collaborators in the WabiSabi coinjoin you linked?
https://kycp.org/#/710d395ca20709096a0778927cb960a466be675b188a234b9b52ffb88bb97a3eYou claimed before that these input and output merges are
"literally identifiable" but you are literally unable to identify any additional information presented by these merges at all.
There is an entire analysis technique called
Boltzmann score that computes resistance to this
potential linking. WabiSabi coinjoin is worse in that matter, as it appears in kycp.org.
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It says "no Boltzmann available" for WabiSabi coinjoins on kycp.