I don't doubt those many ways of shutting this "attack" - according to your opinion - down. I'm asking actually HOW? Those are valid transactions that paid the fees/followed the consensus rules. It's a very dangerous path for the community if shutting it down gets consensus. Because that would start a cycle, in that, another group of people could also complain about some other use case and demand that it should be "shutdown".
I disagree because we're talking about an exploit not "use case" and we've been doing this for always and this is literally the first time the Bitcoin community is showing resistance against fixing an exploit in the protocol! Nobody ever called any of them "censorship" nor where they ever worried about it starting "a dangerous path"!
For example before SegWit soft-fork in 2017 you could exploit the protocol by abusing the dummy stack item in OP_CHECKMULTISIG(VERIFY) ops to inject an arbitrary data to the chain? After the fork, this exploit was patched and such transactions are invalid now. Same with the conditional ops bool that is popped from the stack.
There are also countless examples of how we prevented a lot of different exploits through standard rules that we've already covered a thousand times such as the limits on OP_RETURN outputs.