by which time those participating in mining these unseen 3887 blocks before they match the honest network. those participating wont see those blocks on the network and would be more then likely prefer to jump away from the malicious pool because for 3887 blocks unseen also means not getting any rewards and also the honest network can still beat the dishonest network where the honest network may not get ahead for many other mitigating reasons.
yes the malicious pool after like 4000 blocks can then do it again. and for months respend a respend of a respend by keep repeating it for years. but again those participating unless they are seeing profits can simply jump to a honest pool in SECONDS
so while you think its a guarantee that a malicious pool with have endless power more then honest pools. what you dont realise is when the dishonest group are persuaded in the dishonest task to raid their eth stake, and buy bitcoin hardware, are more so pursuaded once invested in bitcoin to become honest, due to the lack of ongoing sat rewards per block because they are only getting possible returns of investment rarely and only if the malicious pool achieves the goal
You seem to assume here again, at least during these few paragraphs, that the attackers try to steal a larger share of the newly minted coins (as miners). This is not their objective. Their objective is to steal a lot more than that via trades that they then rewrite afterwards, keeping only their ingoing transactions. (And their ultimate objective is actually to cause a crash of the cryptocurrency, assuming that this is what will happen.)
Think of it as the Key and Peele sketch that User @HeRetiK mentioned above, but instead of their "plot" being to earn a salary, their plot is rather to sabotage the bank from within, causing it to crash, and then get a thousandfold greater reward from a competitor.
As a side note, if we dive deeper into this metaphor, then the competitor probably wouldn't try this in real life if it can be traced back to them. This has also been a point that we have discussed a little in this discussion thread: Would the Ethereum stakeholders not ruin their reputation if they did this to Bitcoin? I think it is worth noting here, however, that the attack will in theory only require a fraction of the stakeholders to make it profitable for them,
and they can reward the attack anonymously, as I point out in my preprint. So it will be almost impossible to prosecute, first of all, and the majority of the Ethereum community might even be seen as innocent.
This is assuming that the Ethereum community
wants to be seen as innocent. But with enough campaign money, and enough time, both of which they have, I personally think that they will be able to convince a large part of the public that a switch to PoS is better; both for security, for reduced operational costs, which the users and investors ultimately have to pay, and not least for the planet, which is a topic that seems to generally be efficient in swaying a
large part of the public.