I was asking if sending the CoinJoined outputs to yourself through a multi-hop transaction in Lightning would add an extra layer of privacy. - I'm asking in case coordinators are sanctioned by the government.
Lightning adds an extra layer of privacy when you send to someone else too, so there's no point in "sending coinjoin outputs to yourself".
Confused by that. Here's a hypothetical question. Is there no way for a malicious operator, assuming it is more than 80% of the total liquidity, to monitor and follow the outputs that CoinJoined through its coordinator? How? Why?
No, adding false liquidity is not sufficient to break the privacy of a coinjoin. The attacker would also have to block honest liquidity from participating which would be detected.
- If your private coins were refused, it would mean absolutely nothing. You couldn't know if it's a Sybil attack or chain analysis refusing to accept private coins
If a coin is private, how could Chainanalysis refuse it?
- What you "explained" in that discussion, is that you already need to have private coins for the process to be trustless, which besides ridiculous, is also false, as the client software makes absolutely no Sybil warnings to the user in case their private coins are refused.
What message did your client say when you tested a Sybil attack against it with your coordinator?