Time flies, and this repo with Bitcoin developers consesus will put it safely & security forever!
I don't agree that "time flies". I guess we should solve the post-quantum problem in the next decade, but Willow isn't even the start of a potential threat. While it improves on error correction for an ECDSA break still 4-5 orders of magnitude in terms of qbits are needed to solve P2PK in a few years.
My problem with your contributions here is not so much of technical nature, but of the communication. Aggressive marketing language like in the alt/memecoin world, and fearmongering like in the poll and in your last post does not improve the credibility of your project.
If you want to have any success with the pqc-Bitcoin feature you should really re-think about the way you communicate.
By the way,
https://github.com/QbitsQ still doesn't work (mistercoins's first question), and I don't think you wanted to link to
https://github.com/Qbits. I also don't see your proposal in the developer mailing list even if you claimed you added it there.
You are a bit too optimistic in my opinion. In 2022 researchers in quantum computing estimated at 13 × 10
6 physical qubits what was necessary to break a BTC public key within one day. And they've evaluated the time to reach this threshold at over 10 years. But what will happen if a team somewhere in the world decide to attack a public key during weeks or months instead? They wouldn't need millions of qubits but much less than that. And if they manage to do it, people won't say it's just one single public key, and they took months to realize it, they will just think Bitcoin has been cracked and is not reliable anymore, its price will crash.
We quantify the number of physical qubits required to break the encryption in one hour as a function of code cycle time and the base physical error rate. It would require approximately 317 × 106 physical qubits to break the encryption within one hour using the surface code and a code cycle time of 1 μs, a reaction time of 10 μs, and physical gate error of 10-3. To instead break the encryption within one day, it would require only 13 × 106 physical qubits. If the base physical error rate was instead the more optimistic value of 10-4, 33 × 106 physical qubits would be required to break the encryption in 1 h. This large physical qubit requirement implies that the Bitcoin network will be secure from quantum computing attacks for many years (potentially over a decade).
https://avs.scitation.org/doi/10.1116/5.0073075