....At the same time, I would suggest that you are wrong in regards to your description of the vulnerability being ameliorated by having a stronger pin number, which I believe hardly does shit if someone has physical access to the device with a non-secure element.
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no no JJG .... The PIN is used to encrypt the seed on your device. A strong (long) PIN cannot be cracked via brute force, so it's not possible to decrypt your seed when someone gets hold of your device.
That's why Trezor enabled PINs with 50 digit length (maybe longer), when they fixed the vulnerability of physical access a few years ago.
Means, if your PIN is long enough (has enough entropy) nobody can get the seed out of your device.
No (un)secure element needed !
I recall that the security breach of having physical access to the Trezor was from several years ago, and I thought that the ONLY remedies was avoiding physical access to the Trezor and/or having a passphrase, as is stated in
this Kraken Blog article. The Article describes brute forcing the pin too, yet I cannot recall the pin being less vulnerable based on length and complication, even though what you say makes sense if they have to brute-force the pin, too.
Until I see something more clear, I will have to take what you are saying about the creation of a more robust pin (as the solution to the problem) with a grain of salt.
haha no need to trust me.... that the PIN protects your Trezor against physical attacks by encrypting the seed is written in the adtual article you posted yourself...