Thank you for your thoughtful comment
You raise important concerns about the use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) in a distributed network, particularly regarding potential hardware vulnerabilities. It's clear that hardware restrictions may not be the best approach. The intent of this post is to start a conversation about one of the main criticisms bitcoin faces from investors and lawmakers.
While time-limiting the mining process could be a potential solution, the real goal is to gather ideas from the community on how we can effectively address these criticisms. If there are alternative suggestions on how to address the major concerns surrounding bitcoin, we'd be happy to explore those as well. This post is just a starting point for brainstorming, not a final proposal.
It's weird your thread got deleted. Anyway, i'm here to re-ask these question.
Conceivable is to integrate a Truste Execution Environment (TEE) into the ASIC chips used in the mining process. The TEE then maintains an idle log based on hardware parameters such as power consumption and hardware temperature. The TEE also timestamps and verifies the log and securely signs and transmits it to the blockchain, either at regular intervals or upon verification requests from the verifier.
1. What stops ASIC manufacture to make fake/malicious TEE which send manipulated data to maximize miners income?
2. How Bitcoin full nodes can verify the data comes from TEE without any tampering?
Regular hardware reviews and audits could enhance the system's resilience against tampering and ensure the integrity of idle proofs. Other implementations using network analysis or even physical inspection are also conceivable. Verification of green transactions does not have to be immediate and can be approved with some delay.
Without oracle or 3rd party, how Bitcoin full nodes can verify the audit is being done truthfully and competently?