And in general, you can grind the solution with SIGHASH_SINGLE, combined with SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY, and put a higher output value than input value (to prevent it from being stolen).
Example from testnet4 in transaction
8397c2323e3fa099c15be68399346b2b3d223ef8e81e553242763e1a4c60771a, where coins from tb1qzsjnew5qcn75e4cqdsc6r9v8fjy5ensancqmv2l2n82p0q5f5tls758l9d are sent to tb1q22jvaveydlwxczfvgmsj8rguuk5x7j5xta78ztstnpckt0ajzevqlqk8mz, and some input containing 0.01523662 tBTC is moved into some output containing 0.03141592 tBTC. From the perspective of this single signature, coins are made out of thin air. But because the rest of the transaction can provide coins for it, then it is considered valid.
But to be sure, I think I have to test it first. Because anyway, it seems like this will be the last puzzle, which could be potentially profitable to sweep now, as others require too much resources. Which means, that now we know, more or less, how much Proof of Work is needed, to make it resistant enough for double-spending, and to discourage transaction replacement, while it is flying in mempools.
SIGHASH_NONE only clears the outputs.
// nSequence of signed input
I think it means, that your nSequence can be different than mine. But it should be tested on easier puzzles first.