I think this might be a good thread for this, so here's the cross post:
I have asked about the bloat on the chain before, and the consensus was that with the visible competition enforcing a 10% tax on mining to afford some privacy, then the storage space used to hold the blockchain would be a much less cost. I would like to know much more about this though, because the blockchain is noticeably larger in this protocol by a lot.
The issue is not only the cost of the storage. There is the download speed also. And other complex factors. A tax is probably also going to have Tragedy of the Commons effects, as I explained in my numerous discussions of why transaction fees will never work for Bitcoin in the long-run. There are other articles out now about these by others. Such discussion will take us off on tangents I don't feel like having right now.
Someone from your group private messaged me and ask I provide references.
Here is the recent article I was referring to:
http://radar.oreilly.com/2014/04/bitcoin-what-happens-when-the-miners-pack-up-their-gear.htmlI raised similar issues last year as follows.
Transactions Withholding Attack"Spiraling Transaction Fees Destruction" of bitcoin (Transactions fees are a Tragedy of the Commons)
I've been trying to raise awareness of this issue. The typical response seems to be, "when Bitcoin addresses the problem, so will we." To me this means it will never be addressed. The obvious solution is to perpetually increase the money supply, always rewarding miners with new coins.
Tacotime mentioned a hard fork proposal to never let the block reward drop below 1 coin:
if (blockReward < 1){
blockReward = 1;
}
I assume this is merely delaying the problem, however. I proposed a fixed annual debasement (say 2%) with a tx fee cap of like 0.001% of the current block reward (or whatever sounds reasonable). That way we still get the spam protection without worrying about fee escalation down the road.
Any solution involving debasement, however, will be met with harsh criticism, because "inflation is bad" and stuff.
I think the proposal is a good sign that he's recognized the need as valid.
What I also think is that both of your solutions don't really target the "non-arbitrary" direction that is persistent in CryptoNote.
Especially for something like an annual debasement -- is there any way to work the 2.8% proposed by a minimum of 1, or yours at 2% into something that is more adaptive?
What drives the need for inflation? Are these variables trackable in the protocol? Can they be applied in a fashion that would allow a variable rate of inflation based on some specific need for it -- more like a window from 1% to 3%. Would that be more ideal?
Clearly we can't have the value of these coins approaching infinity, so I can agree that there needs to be a debasement. But, to what extent does it need to be debased?