DRK coiling hard on the 15-min/hourly. Should see a large directional break one way or the other in the next 30-60 minutes as the pattern continues to its apex.
Looks like a breakout downwards is more likely at this point.
Called it... DRK heading down to a more reasonable valuation. I'd say a good bottom target is somewhere around $5 over the next bit.
Masternodes are a faulty and horrible way to implement anonymous transactions. This coin's ideas are fundamentally flawed.
And again... no source code? SKETCHY. Why anyone with half a brain is running this wallet is completely beyond me.
This coin is unique and doesn't have any competitors.
It's unique, in that it uses an absolutely horrible insecure means of anonymous transactions. (And the dev can't even get masternodes working properly!)
Take a look at Monero - proper ring-signature-based anonymous spends that don't rely on centralized nodes. And a hashing algorithm that actually makes some sense...
X11 is a horrible idea from a security perspective - chained hashing with multiple algorithms is seriously insecure. If a pre-image attack against any one of the 11 algorithms is found, then the entire X11 stack can be pre-imaged. So basically, with every added algo in this chaining method, the PoW gets LESS secure. Simply stupid.
You're right that DRK is unique and has no direct competitors - you have to have a pretty poor understanding of cryptography to implement something this bad.
Monero has already been covered here.
I'm interested in your second claim as it seems counter intuitive to me, but you may be a better cryptographer than I. If we know that the second hashing function used produces output O, such that H(I(m)), where m is secret, I is the first hashing function, H is the second hashing function, and the second is compromised, wouldn't you still be fine as there are still 9 fully functioning hashes that follow the faulty one? It seems this would only be a risk if the very last hashing function were compromised. Even then you would need to know how to generate the correct input to the last hashing function using the other hashing functions. It seems inherently more secure to me.