*You* don't have *any* coins at that address. The address, assuming your description is correct, is not yours but Cryptsy's. This entirely defeats a significant purpose of anon coins: To make your balance and transactions hard or impossible to determine.

Obscuring your balance and transactions from casual observers is easy, as you've "discovered": Just use a service that sufficiently mixes funds and moves them into addresses that act as pools. Like any exchange.

The problem is that if you use just a small number of such services from a small pool of such services, while you have protected yourself against casual, unprivileged adversaries, you may be *more* vulnerable to certain classes of adversaries, such as organized crime (Cryptsy will be a much more attractive target than CryptoNick; the payoff of hacking Cryptsy would be far greater) or governments (whether via a subpoena, or surveillance), or simply insiders at these services. You also face the problem of substantial trust problems related to these services.

It should be quite clear that for a lot of people who support crypto-coins, anonymity just against unprivileged observers is not seen as sufficient. "Real anonymity" against privileged actors is essential to be attractive. Whether it is to avoid tax authorities, or buy drugs, or being able to support controversial political organizations (whether good or bad causes) that may be illegal in some countries, or just for the principle of freedom from intervention.

Not least because those who wants anonymity protections against casual observers, as you've demonstrated, already have plenty of solutions in terms of the exchanges and other services.

If this wasn't the case, the "solution" would simply be a small-ish network of mixers with retained ledgers and an app that would distribute your balance, and use an API to request addresses for "blind" deposits to your accounts, and nobody would bother spending lots of time trying to come up with better anonymity.