it looks to me that mining would be best described as being in a
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium - cypherdoc
Highlights are mine:"
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies such that each players (miner's) strategy is a best response ((results in the highest available payoff (block reward)) against the equilibrium strategies of the other players (miners).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium only requires that the action taken by each agent (miner) be best against the actual equilibrium actions taken by the other players (miners), and not necessarily against all possible actions of the other players (miners). In other words, it's expected for some miners to be malicious.
A Nash equilibrium has the nice property that it is stable: if each player expects 'a' to be the profile of actions played, then no player (miner) has any incentive to change his or her action (no incentive to start cheating). In other words, no player (miner) regrets having played the action that he or she played in a Nash equilibrium."
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1968579Nice. I hadn't looked at it that way but it makes perfect sense.
Nash equilibrium works well in theory, the real world is a little more messy.
Pre-mass adoption there are so many outside interests seeking bitcoin failure that there are other incentives at play.
Once there is more distribution and buy in, the full effects of the Nash Equilibrium will be much stronger than they are today.
the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a
non-cooperative game; therefore, i think the Nash Equilibrium takes those hostile actors into account. the minimum # of participants required to apply the theory is 2 and doesn't depend on large #'s. what's also important for all actors to know and understand,
and to know that the others know, is that the longest blockchain and the POW required to construct it is mathematically immutable. b/c we know that the hashrate of the Bitcoin Network is thousands of times larger than most of the supercomputers on Earth makes the strategical decision making of each individual actor clear; don't cheat.
Understood, I'm more referring to the folks that are the non-participants in the game. Lest we forget these currently vastly outnumber the participants with respect to potential game resources available to them. Game-ending scenarios are often dismissed as impossible when in fact they are merely unlikely, as are the application of non-monetary/computing power factors. Threats to date have generally been within the game players, and Nash applies well.
In general I not only agree but the also salute the application of the principle.
Consider however the implications if one were to throw something like stuxnet into the works or a fab level exploit into each of the main chip makers, say by coercion or covertly, and subsequently activated? There are defenses certainly, but it would be disruptive and could be timed with other types of interference. Unlikely but possible. Thankfully, we are not under serious attack or opposition, but I'd still give a BTC =~ 0 a >0 p value, and Nash holds the rest in place.