Re: XC uses multisig address and transaction? The answer is NO!! Look at facts here!
hahaha, m-of-m multisig, this is the first time I see this, very entertaining... used in mix transactions trustlessly?? This is even more a joke, by trustless you mean the m members doing mixing are not trusted, so if there is one bad guy, you all screwed, because m-of-m address in order to spend, you need everyone to sign, if one bad guy not sign, your fund is locked forever.
This seems written by a guy who has zero knowledge about multisig, except the word "multisig".
That's why the altcoin there are so many scam coins.
This seems written by a guy who has zero knowledge about multisig, except the word "multisig".
That's why the altcoin there are so many scam coins.
No:
Quote
3) Supplementary information:
- XC's multipath technology, used for obfuscating the amount sent in a transaction and the identity of sender and receiver, makes use of m-of-m transactions in order to achieve trustless mixing.
- Trustless mixing is a world-first. Nobody's ever done it before. Hence my prior request that you ask questions before coming to conclusions.
- m-of-m requires that all parties sign or else the transaction is invalidated.
- As such, m-of-m prevents bad nodes stealing coins instead of forwarding them.
- if a transaction is invalidated, the participating nodes resync the session-based network they form for the transaction in question, and proceed.
- XC's multipath technology, used for obfuscating the amount sent in a transaction and the identity of sender and receiver, makes use of m-of-m transactions in order to achieve trustless mixing.
- Trustless mixing is a world-first. Nobody's ever done it before. Hence my prior request that you ask questions before coming to conclusions.
- m-of-m requires that all parties sign or else the transaction is invalidated.
- As such, m-of-m prevents bad nodes stealing coins instead of forwarding them.
- if a transaction is invalidated, the participating nodes resync the session-based network they form for the transaction in question, and proceed.
Then why you need m-of-m at all, you can just process with the assumption m-of-m will fail. The m-of-m there is absolutely of no use.
You're actually quite close to the truth here.
The assumption that m-of-m will fail is exactly what is needed for a bad node to fail at stealing coins.
If a node doesn't sign, if gets kicked out of the ad-hoc network formed for the transaction in question, and then the network resyncs and signs again.
no in this case m-of-m transaction is no use, and if you remove it the system should just function as before. That's why no one is using m-of-m multisig in this kind of trustless system. m-of-m is virtually of no use.
m-of-m prevents a node stealing the funds.
n-of-m sounds weaker to me. Why wouldn't you want all the relevant parties to sign? What if one of the parties who doesn't sign steals funds?