The CPoS system is not yet deployed so we do not know its vulnerabilies, but it's design is very unlike existing PoS systems and so AnonyMint's criticisms of PoS would not apply. His other criticisms of how far incumbent special interests would go to stop the replacement of fiat would hold however.

When I first discussed proof-of-stake ideas with Bitcoin core developers, they said that solving the distributed consensus problem was the main issue. I thought about it and sidestepped that problem by starting with a conventional financial transaction network design and altering it to maximally preserve the Satoshi Social Contract and protocol compatibility with the existing Bitcoin network.  I designed geographic dispersion and non-affiliated node ownership to achieve resistance to government shutdown. I used a cognitive architecture to enable trust-free software agents to transparently operate the system. I achieve all the technical and performance advantages of a central mint, but avoid a single point of failure or trust by using a nomadic software agent to create new blocks.

There can be no 51% percent attack unless an attacker successfully impersonates a majority of the paid-for full nodes. CPoS makes this hard in the same way that VisaNet safeguards credit card transactions. CPoS full nodes are authenticated by X.509 certificates issued from the Texai certificate authority. All traffic between nodes is encrypted with TLS/SSL. Each CPoS full node does not use DNS to navigate the network, rather static IP addresses are securely transmitted offline. Private keys will be secured by hardware. A paid-for set of network operations centers will actively manage the network with regard to intrusion detection and mitigation.

In CPoS there is one canonical copy of the non-forking blockchain that paid-for full nodes will replicate. Volunteers may download CPoS software to replicate and verify the blockchain too. In CPoS there is no competition of miners to create the longest chain, rather the single nomadic mint agent creates new blocks for the whole network without competition, and at no effort. Bitcoind already has this no-effort PoW ability for regression testing.

There can be no Finney attacks because CPoS transactions are immutable once they enter the network. An issued transaction is routed directly to the nomadic mint agent's current full node along redundant paths. An acknowledgement of the accepted transaction is immediately broadcast into the network so that users know their transaction will be contained in the next block. This method also prevents lost or ignored transactions. Unlike the Satoshi Bitcoin network and its altcoin clones having best-effort volunteer full nodes, CPoS paid-for full nodes are high availability, high bandwidth, and rationally connected for maximum performance and redundancy.

There can be no double spends in the CPoS network because there is one canonical blockchain and issued transactions are routed to the nomadic mint along the fastest path. The CPoS is not peer-to-peer allowing full nodes to join and leave at will - rather it is a permanent network of peers with an optimal topology.

I am keeping proof-of-stake in the project title but my thinking is evolving away from using block rewards to pay dividends to existing coin holders. Users can migrate from PoW to CPoS forks because of features and transparent investment of the block rewards directly into making the Bitcoin Core and other infrastructure better.

-Stephen Reed