That's a pretty good peg. I was thinking that if the block subsidy algorithm were inverted, it would take some serious number crunching to derive an 'equilibrium' reward number around which the reward would either increase or decrease. That would take some serious analysis indeed as it would directly affect network hashrate and profitability: you need a very precise number that neither causes super profitability (attracting everybody and their brother) or the opposite (driving everyone away), and that, as much as possible, also decreases volatility and leads to a stable steadily rising user base.

I think the same analysis needs to be done with deriving a peg. .003 would have everyone on AID, but for how long? And what would that miner's average profile look like? And this, of course, assumes that a peg would be honored and that a 'black market' would not arise. A realistic peg would be an absolute necessity, and I think it's probably going to take some serious thinking. What network hashrate would we really like to shoot for? What would be feasible? What would be reasonable to expect. 6 GH? More? Do we really want to press the envelop in search of as many new early adopters as we possibly can? 12 GH? Or less? A sustained network hashrate of 6 GH would lead to 1 billion or so AID by 2024. That would be a theoretical peg of .021! A real .003 peg would assume an average sustained network hashrate of 42 GH. That's ambitious, but not at all impossible.

Most importantly though, is the fact that the money supply has got to be there, if not, it's dead in the water; the rewards have to be there to begin with (with or without present buyers), or it just ain't getting off the ground (in my very humble opinion).