Whether your output is included in a mix makes no difference to your ability to spend it.
Try re-reading what I wrote.
Hint: I was referring to when bad transactions mix with the same outputs as I do, thus if you can't de-anonymize, then my transaction gets mixed with the double-spent outputs even though neither I (nor my prior trace of coin history) did double-spend.
I can fix that by mixing with no outputs other than mine, thus no anonymity.
I suppose this applies to any form of transaction mixing, not just ring signatures. And it is just a risk of mixing with more outputs increasing the risk of mixing with a double-spend.
Perhaps a difference is if I am sure I am mixing with very old outputs that are unlikely to be double-spent, then another bad transaction mixing with those plus some that are double-spent, I am thinking you can't remove me from the bad set in some convoluted hierarchal scenarios.
Edit: the more I think about it, it is applicable to any form of block chain mixing in transactions, not just ring signatures. The greater your anonymity set, the greater the risk of dominoes cascade of double-spends into your transaction.