Re: [EDIT] A more 'difficult' algorithm for POW based on area?

Quote from: qdoop on October 22, 2014, 01:32:57 PM

[EDIT]

Quote from: btchris on October 22, 2014, 02:08:16 PM

You're proposing that the total work be based on the value of the individual hashes, instead of the hash targets, is that correct?

This could incentivize a miner who happens to find a hash with an unusually low value to refrain from immediately broadcasting it. See, for example, this attack proposed a few years ago by casascius, which becomes viable with this proposed change.

Thanks to btchris for feedback

As a measure of performance of a curve/blockchain in order to avoid the above attack we could sum the sign changes between two curves +1,0,-1 comparing curve values point wise and assuming max value were a curve lucks a point.

the scores of the curves would then became

(A)-(C)=+1+1-1
(B)-(A)=+1+1-1
(B)-(C)=+1+1-1-1

I have edited the OP to take advantage of your feedback on this kind of attack
1-6 comfirmation attacks are always possible even under normal conditions although you have to be extremely lucky.

What is the issue I try to make more difficult is the possibility of long chains replacing the current