Post
Topic
Board Off-topic
Re: Scientific proof that God exists?
by
username18333
on 30/10/2014, 07:21:39 UTC

The FSM is meant to be an analogue of a polytheistic god, not a monotheistic one.  There's a huge difference between the two.  Same thing goes for the teapot orbiting Venus.

Could you source your argument for me? I couldn't find anywhere that the FSM is a polytheistic god. As a matter of fact, what I found seems to describe it as being a monotheistic one. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flying_Spaghetti_Monster

This is from the wiki:

Quote
Because of its popularity and exposure, the Flying Spaghetti Monster is often used as a contemporary version of Russell's teapot

Now, referring to the teapot...

Quote
Russell wrote that if he claims that a teapot orbits the Sun somewhere in space between the Earth and Mars, it is nonsensical for him to expect others to believe him on the grounds that they cannot prove him wrong. Russell's teapot is still referred to in discussions concerning the existence of God.

So, there you go.  Likening FSM to a monotheistic god is stupid because FSM is likened to a teapot, and likening a teapot to a monotheistic god is also stupid.

What is being highlighted by those analogies is the lacking falsifiability of the theory of "God" theists often espouse.

But it's not a sound analogy because, first of all, we already know that a monotheistic god is completely off the table as far as empirical study goes; the scope of empiricism doesn't extend that far.  Second of all, there are different types of falsifiability and the empirical kind differs from the logical kind. 

Science yields a posteriori knowledge, i.e. knowledge derived from experience and empiricism.  However, philosophy yields a priori knowledge which is independent of both experience and empiricism.  Scientists often forget this type of knowledge exists, and in fact scientists rely on a priori knowledge upon which the scientific method is founded.

Therefore, the question shouldn't be one in terms of empirical falsifiability, which, while great for the teapot and FSM, cannot be reasonably applied to a monotheistic god.  Instead, the question is whether we have access to enough a priori knowledge to formulate conclusions about the Universe/God. 

So long as a "God" is said to impact "His" world, "His" world will try that impact. If it cannot, "He" was not.

There's no need to make the unnecessary assumption that God "says" anything at all.  First, we need to establish a method of exploring the God concept to determine whether it must exist by logical necessity. You took it a step further by invoking a secondary characteristic.  

But truly, there is really only one good starting point from which you can begin to explore the God concept, and that is to start working on a theory of theories themselves.  Absolutely every single definition that we have for anything is actually a theory of that thing.  For example, if you look up "apple" in the dictionary, that is essentially a theory of the apple...of the things that gives an apple its apple-ness that allows it to be distinguished from everything else.  So, it's only logical that we must start with a theory of theories so that we can know how the theories we create in our minds are related to the things we form theories about.

My criticism speaks to what "is said" about "God," not what could be said thereabout.

To clarify, are you referring to the problem of putting the cart before the horse, i.e asserting a definition before exploration (which is similar to the scientific limitations resulting from the problem of induction)?

I'm speaking to the difficulties of evidencing one's fiction.

Okay, then yes, you are referring to the problem of induction.  I agree, it's a problem because it implies you already know what something is before you've explored it.

There's a better approach.  It's described here: http://ctmu.org/

Click on the link, and then click "here" in the first bullet point that says, "Christopher Langan's article on the Theory of Theories, can be viewed here."

I am speaking to the testimony of the "true believer"—not theorizations thereabout.