PD uses 26 lowercase letters and 10 numbers in their seed, so 36 different characters with a length of 64 characters. So 36^64 =
4011991914547630480065053387702443812690402487741812225955731622655455723258857 248542161222254985216 different seeds.
The bitcoin network calculates double SHA256 hashes with a speed of 297,275,048.09 GH/s.
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Ps, I am not that good in math, if there is a problem please correct me, but the idea is clear I think.
One problem I see is that there are many more client seeds than sha256 outputs. So "just" reversing the hash isn't enough. On average you'll find 3.5e22 different server seeds which hash to any given server seed hash, but you'll need to figure out which one is the right one. Not that it matters.
Your point stands that reversing a single PD server seed is much harder than reversing any single Bitcoin private key. So instead of typing to steal a few thousand coins from PD, why not steal tens or hundreds of thousands from a rich Bitcoin address?
No, I'm saying that it is safer to change the seed everytime. That's it.
But I do not expect you to understand this. So, do not worry.
The risk of somebody being able to brute force an sha256 hash is pretty much zero.
The risk of a dice site cheating players is significantly higher. It has happened at least twice this year already (on another site).
So if your goal is to "protect players and investors" you should go with the provably fair system that pretty much every established dice site uses (SatoshiDice is the only exception I can think of).