Already edited my post above - looks like it will support entry on the hardware wallet. But even Trezor T still allows users to enter the passphrase on the computer instead. They really need to remove this option altogether, but they can't while people still use the Trezor One I guess (which will be the case for many years yet).

And Passport and Coldcard. But completely different to Ledger, who to my understanding run BOLOS on the secure element itself.

We do not run code on the chip itself. The Secure Element simply stores a secret that can be used to decrypt the recovery seed, i.e., it never actually knows what your recovery seed is.

It is not, but the secure element we chose allows us to disclose any vulnerability, if we find any. So before our Tropic Square open-source chip is ready, the OPTIGA Trust M secure element was the best option.

But speaking of Trezor, there are some exclusive news to be discovered in this interview: first of all, Trezor is planning to launch two new hardware wallets in 2023 and 2024. The first one is an affordable unit which improves on the Trezor One design and retains the physical buttons – the code name for it is Trezor Model R, and according to the ongoing GitHub commits it features a 3-button layout, a USB-C connector, and a SLIP39 (Shamir Secret Sharing) integration. If it costs around $70, the Trezor Model R is bound to be the most affordable Shamir-powered hardware wallet on the market. It’s bound to launch sometime during the fall of 2023.

The second hardware wallet that Trezor will add to their line is a more high-end device. Not too much information is known about it, but it’s expected to be more feature-packed than the Trezor Model T and get sold at a similar or even lower price point. The expected launch date is sometime in 2024, but the bad news is that it won’t come with the Tropic Square open source chip.

According to Matej Zak, Tropic Square‘s TASSIC (Transparent Authenticated Secure Storage Integrated Circuit) chip is still in testing phase and will enter production sometime in 2024. Therefore, it can’t become available sooner than the year 2025. The good news is, however, that Trezor will be the first company to benefit from this unique security chip. So the Czech-made hardware wallets will finally get the kind of uncompromising physical security that they have been seeking.

We are back! 🚀🚀

We received funding by a donor who so far chose to remain anonymous. Our work should be secured for another year thanks to 🤫 ...

A lot was left undone in the recent months. Many reviews are outdated and not all are marked as such.

Bluetooth is not recommendable. Better to get a USB hardware wallet, but not still that recommendable, the best is to just make use of QR code while making transaction which is better. Have you seen a device that its bluetooth will always be on? I haven't seen such a device before.

2. QR codes allow visually representing the same information. Because the transaction is too big for a single QR code, an animated code is used. Again, the information is not human readable, and another wallet is needed to verify the data.

If you simply try to read the data with a regular QR code scanner, you’ll be none the wiser:

Keystone’s QR codes are transparent. Users can verify what is getting in and out of their hardware wallets, ensuring no sensitive information is leaked. The team released the hardware wallet industry’s first open-source tool to decode the QR codes for users to know how the software works and enable signing off on intended transactions.

@Petr Flídr

Je nějaký odhad, kdy by mohl být první trezor s tímto čipem?

@slushcz

Realisticky 2024, hardware is hard :-).

@Petr Flídr

Any guess when the first trezor with this chip might be?

@slushcz

Realistically 2024, hardware is hard :-).

I guess that confirms I was wrong ^{[they "didn't" alter the foundation letters' color into black]}, but while we're waiting for n0nce's review, I'd like to complain about their packaging:

• On their "unboxing video ^{[part one]}", I noticed only the outer box comes with a tamper-evident seal and the inner/main box is only bubble & shrink wrapped! I do know there's a way to check and verify if you've got the correct product, but this way of packaging still gives certain users a chance to figure out a non-detectable way to bypass such things in the future.

Thanks for the update! I haven't got mine yet, but even when I do get it, I will need a bit of time to unbox, review and compare to v1 of course.
I'm glad to hear that they are finally shipping. I also noticed that their Envoy application is now available, but I'm not sure what you guys think about this topic. Installing an application (binary), compiled, from an app store, that holds the xpub of your hardware wallet? There is no way of verifying it not breaching user privacy. It could easily do a one-off HTTP request, sending the xpub to Foundation.
I might find the time to have a look at their source code to at least check they don't have Google AdSense or other known spying frameworks in use, as I believe that's one of the biggest 'black boxes' in most mobile applications.

The closed-source drawback
Secure chips are not even that expensive, so why does not every hardware wallet use them? The main drawback is that secure chips are closed source. Firmware running on a secure chip cannot be released as open source due to enforced non-disclosure agreements.

When it comes to firmware securing your bitcoin, creating random seeds and signing transactions, trusting closed source software that cannot be independently audited is just not good enough. In our opinion, you should not need to trust the manufacturer of your hardware wallet (and all its individual employees) to belong to the “good guys”, diligently finding their own bugs without independent reviews and then actually fixing them.

Bitstamp cancels plans to charge Inactivity Fee

We are not implementing the monthly €10 inactivity fee. 

Thank you for speaking out, you have been heard. 

And we've changed course as a result. 

https://blog.bitstamp.net/post/bitstamp-cancels-plans-to-charge-inactivity-fee/

So, BTCitcoin fell to 20K as some were hoping for. But what was the reason for that. From what I've read in https://www.zerohedge.com/markets/great-celsius-implosion-what-went-wrong-and-how-much-more-will-bitcoin-drop it is another imploding "blockchain" company.

tl;dr. Celsius may have started as an arbitrage platform giving yield for those fools lending their BTC and shitcoins. But as the arbitrage dissapeared 6 months ago, they simply became a ponzi risking their client assets by making enourmous shorts. They had more than enough BTCitcoins to stop any increase in the price, liquidating practically 100% of the longs. But their problem is that what they do is perfectly visible by everyone. People started to realize slowly they've been scammed just like bitconnect.

 Now their margin call is at 16.8k (used to be 18.3K yesterday) as seen in https://oasis.app/25977#Overview. How much collateral BTC they will be able to add is unknown. Now we have a proof that all this downard pressure in the last 6 months was caused partially by this ponzi, who could give yields in BTC only if the price was falling. So, we need to cut off the cancer ASAP. People have to withdraw their funds and invest properly in BTCitcoin. After that I'm quite confident BTCitcoin will start recovering.

Secure element information updated for ColdCard Mk4 hardware wallet, that now have two secure elements SE1 Microchip ATECC608B and SE2 Maxim DS28C36B, along with STM32 main microcontroller.
They are using something called Pairing Secret, that means that secret is shared between three components, two secure elements and microprocessor.
If one of those chips get's compromised, wallet with secret will be safe, and they use trick PIN's for improving security of their devices.
ColdCard developers explained better in more details how Dual Secure Elements work on their github page:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Coldcard/firmware/master/docs/mk4-secure-elements.md

More information about second secure element they use - DeepCover Secure Authenticator Maxim DS28C36:
https://www.maximintegrated.com/en/products/embedded-security/secure-authenticators/DS28C36.html

Sorry, but I don't understand what do you mean exactly...
You plan to order hardware wallet, but you already know that you are going to return it later or what?
It's pretty standard procedure and I don't remember last time I had to return something that I ordered, especially if it was paid by bitcoin.