Thanks Saint-loup, that's why we said 'Time flies'.

A new issue under 'Feature Request' was submitted for review and feedback.

https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/31485

Greetings again, you have valid questions if any doubts, we have suggestion, just simply contribute in this repo (https://github.com/QBlockQ/pqc-bitcoin) in terms of code and testing of the new integrated cryptography that will permanently eliminate the quantum threats and as you can see yesterday Google announced of Wilow which could potentailly break RSA as the responce of question on the largest semiprime that can be factored!.  Time flies, and this repo with Bitcoin developers consesus will put it safely & security forever!

Thank you so much, the subject has been transferred to Bitcoin Developers conservation group!

[/quote]

he SegWit-style PQC implementation has been successfully pushed. Here's what we've accomplished:

1. SegWit Integration:
PQC signatures now stored in witness area
Reduced impact on block size through witness discount
Backward compatibility with old nodes

2. New Address Format:
Added Bech32m support with witness version 2
New bc1z prefix for PQC addresses
Compatible with existing wallet software

3. Validation Updates:
Modified validation logic for witness-based signatures
Implemented proper weight calculations
Maintained hybrid signature approach

it is now addressing both the block size concerns and backward compatibility issues.  BTW, we need any comments in Github and we need also Bitcoin Core community consensus.

1.  Already responded to mistercoin's question.
2.  Latest Bitcoin Core version.
3.  We provided the required integration of 3 post-quantum cryptograph namely keber, FrodoKEM, and NTRU which also support for hybrid key generation and signing
4.  HybridKey class for managing both classical and PQC keys and Integration with Bitcoin's existing key management system.
5.  Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) aims to address the vulnerabilities of current cryptographic systems like ECDSA, which are not secure against quantum computers.
5.  Soft fork was implemented to maintain backward compatibility, and below is simple explanation of how miners/nodes validate the new PQC transactions:

A.  Old Nodes (not PQC):
     1. Only see and validate the classical ECDSA signature
     2. Ignore the additional PQC data (they treat it as anyone-can-spend)
     3. Continue working as normal

B.  New Nodes (PQC):
     1. First validate the classical ECDSA signature
     2. Then validate the PQC signature
     3. Transaction is only valid if BOTH signatures are valid
     4. Reject if either signature fails

C.  Miners:
     1. Old miners: Mine transactions based only on ECDSA
     2. New miners: Mine transactions only if both ECDSA and PQC signatures are valid

This creates a soft fork where new rules are stricter than old rules.  This dual-signature approach ensures backward compatibility while gradually transitioning the network to quantum resistance.  This dual-signature approach ensures backward compatibility while gradually transitioning the network to quantum resistance.

[/quote]

Codebase was forked previously but Bitcoin core community deleted it so we created a new repo.  Technically speaking, implementing this pqc as explained in this repo will eliminate the quantum threats forever!

[/quote]

Greetings all,

QBlock with the help of Qbits, implement PQC in the bitcoin core for your review and concuss.  Thanks


https://github.com/QBlockQ/pqc-bitcoin.

Implementation Status:
The core PQC algorithms (Kyber, FrodoKEM, NTRU) are implemented
The hybrid key management system is in place
Transaction signing with PQC is integrated
Configuration options are available

QBlock

QPC implementation is not a major job.  It can be done, just approach us, after implemented it then this subject on the past and bitcoin is finally quantum-safe from any future threats of quantum computers or technologies.  

What's holding your hands for not doing it!!!

PQC can be implemented now and by that you close the subject from now , so why you are waiting for. 

QBlock can do that

https://github.com/QBlockQ

best regards

Bitcoin's current cryptographic infrastructure is at risk from the future advancements in quantum computing. While today's quantum computers aren't powerful enough yet to break Bitcoin's security, experts predict that within the next 10-20 years, quantum computers could become capable of posing a real threat to the cryptographic methods that secure Bitcoin transactions. Addressing this now will ensure the network's long-term security.

Quantum Threats to Bitcoin

Bitcoin uses the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to secure transactions. ECDSA relies on the difficulty of solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which is infeasible for classical computers. However, Shor's algorithm, when run on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer, could efficiently solve this problem, allowing an attacker to derive private keys from publicly exposed keys.

When Bitcoin transactions are made, public keys are revealed on the blockchain. A future quantum computer could exploit these exposed public keys to determine the corresponding private keys, leading to potential theft of user funds. This is a significant concern for Bitcoin wallets that have already conducted transactions, as their public keys are now publicly available.

Timeline and Need for Proactive Measures

Although quantum computers capable of breaking ECDSA do not yet exist, the development of such machines is accelerating. "Store now, decrypt later" is a significant concern: an attacker could collect encrypted data today and decrypt it in the future when quantum technology becomes capable. This is why post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is necessary to secure Bitcoin before it becomes vulnerable.

Challenges to Implementing PQC

Consensus Requirement: Bitcoin's decentralized nature means that any change requires community-wide consensus. A transition to PQC would likely need a soft fork or even a hard fork, requiring significant coordination and agreement from miners, node operators, and the wider community.

Key and Signature Size: Most quantum-resistant algorithms involve larger key sizes and signatures, potentially increasing transaction sizes and fees. This would affect scalability and efficiency, which is already a topic of concern for Bitcoin.

Backward Compatibility: Ensuring compatibility for older transactions is a challenge. Users who don't upgrade their wallets may become vulnerable if their public keys are already exposed.

Potential Solutions

The Bitcoin community could consider a hybrid cryptographic approach during the transition period, where both classical and post-quantum algorithms are used. This would allow gradual adoption and testing before quantum computers become a practical threat.

Recent upgrades like Taproot have improved Bitcoin's efficiency and privacy but have not addressed quantum threats directly. However, the experience with network upgrades like Taproot could serve as a model for future changes that implement PQC.

Conclusion

Quantum computing poses a potential risk to Bitcoin's cryptographic foundation. While the immediate threat may still be a decade away, proactive measures are necessary to protect user funds and ensure the resilience of the network. The transition to quantum-resistant cryptographic methods will be a challenging but essential step for safeguarding Bitcoin's future security.

The community must come together to discuss, research, and plan for this transition to ensure Bitcoin remains the secure, decentralized store of value it was designed to be.