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Showing 20 of 31 results by Ulysses
Bitcoind doesn't accept remote connections unless their ip is specified in the config file.
I mean 8333 port, not RPC.
If they only used block increment for confirmation, then you could send to their bitcoin one transaction, and to the other part of network different transaction with the same coins.
I think you misunderstood the Mybitcoin's statement about the cause of the hack.
If i correctly interpret this statements, then Mybitcoin accepted transaction as verified after the block number was incremented, not after that transaction was included in the block. This opens an easy way to drain their coins without block chain fork, especially if you know their bitcoind IP address.
Quote
It appears to be human error combined with a misunderstanding of how Bitcoin secures transactions into the next block. Our programmer was under the assumption that one block was good enough to secure a transaction.
[...]
In hindsight we should have credited deposits after one confirmation so they would show up in the transaction history
[...]
In hindsight we should have credited deposits after one confirmation so they would show up in the transaction history
If i correctly interpret this statements, then Mybitcoin accepted transaction as verified after the block number was incremented, not after that transaction was included in the block. This opens an easy way to drain their coins without block chain fork, especially if you know their bitcoind IP address.
Re: HERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT THREAD TELLING YOU NOT TO MINE WITH DEEPBIT
Right. I mean, why in the earth would a big country want to destroy the faith in bitcoins?
By hacking deepbit? This seems much less plausible to me, than BTC hitting $1 000 000.
Re: HERE IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT THREAD TELLING YOU NOT TO MINE WITH DEEPBIT
Did you read Satoshi's paper?
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
This applies both to Tycho, possible attacker, bankers and all other capitalists. This doesn't apply to states, but US hacking deepbit to do a double spend seems to be absurd to me.
If the security of bitcoin is dependent on goodwill of one person, then bitcoin is a bad idea. I believe in bitcoin and don't believe on their dependency on Tycho or any other man.
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
This applies both to Tycho, possible attacker, bankers and all other capitalists. This doesn't apply to states, but US hacking deepbit to do a double spend seems to be absurd to me.
If the security of bitcoin is dependent on goodwill of one person, then bitcoin is a bad idea. I believe in bitcoin and don't believe on their dependency on Tycho or any other man.
Re: What assumptions are people using to justify adding mining rigs?
A smart attacker would create his pool ahead of time - e.g. one of the current pools could actually be the attacker. They would have two versions of the mining pool SW - version #1 is the "honest" one, they would run this for a while, likely with low-to-no fees, to get a reasonable user base and reputation. Then, when they feel they are ready, they would DDOS enough other pools to make people flock to theirs. Once they hit 50%, they would activate version #2 of their mining pool SW, the one that steals coins/double spends/whatever. Since they own more than half the hashing power at that point, they win. People will eventually figure it out, but when they do, confidence in BTC will be crushed and you would see a crash in values.
You miss the quote from Satoshi's paper:
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.
Of course there are sociopaths, who don't want make money. But usually they can't raise capital. And the notion of state (who doesn't need to be for profit and have capital) running >50% of network power to double spend seems to be absurd to me (though i can be wrong).
Re: I've got a suggestion to make BTC unquestionablly legal. not sure new or not.
Can we buy a small UN recognized country in Oceania? E.g. Nauru have population of ~10000. If you hand $1 000 000 to each citizen, will them agree to turn their country into libertarian Bitland? 
Quite honestly I can each week pass all my funds to MtGox the withdraw them to a new wallet.
Only $1000 or 58 BTC (with current rate) per day can be withdrawn. Don't do it
Re: What assumptions are people using to justify adding mining rigs?
Overcoming the entire network right now is easily within reach of any large or governmental organization. The last calculations that I remember seeing about this recently said that it would take less than $2,000,000USD worth of hardware.
The problem with this calculation, is that by the time they got through bureaucracy & installation, they need 10 times this amount
Re: why do people use pools with fees when the cost to switch is nil?
You can't be sure you are getting more from 0% fee pool than from 2% fee pool without comparison on a lengthy intervals. The pool operator can skim blocks (there is no free launch :), pool operator can implement protocol inefficiently and give identical getworks to multiple clients, pool can get a lot of invalid blocks due to bad connection to bitcoin network, pool can get a lot of stale shares.
Unfortunately, to this time nobody did a proper comparison of pools according to their published statistic, so you can only use your intuition to choose one.
Unfortunately, to this time nobody did a proper comparison of pools according to their published statistic, so you can only use your intuition to choose one.
I think it will be pools, who provide double spend protection for bitcoin billing: they will get payment in exchange on building block chain on blocks with "protected" transactions in case of double spending attempt. You make contracts with several pools to be sure you are well above 50%+, and you can accept bitcoins instantly.
And it's in the interest of such billing to publish transactions openly, so other miners could use them (or else they will be generating orphaned blocks in case of double spend attempts).
And it's in the interest of such billing to publish transactions openly, so other miners could use them (or else they will be generating orphaned blocks in case of double spend attempts).
The idea is good, but it allows to inflate the shares amount by 0.3%-1.5% (depending on the number of long polling clients) with stale shares.
Another way to defeat this system is to declare the block invalid or do not show the block (pretend, that it wasn't solved).
Another way to defeat this system is to declare the block invalid or do not show the block (pretend, that it wasn't solved).
It appears to me that by the time double spending is detected you have two problems. Somebody has already lost their money and it is already too late. I am confident that an attack would be executed in seconds with the initial spend and the blocks in the pool (s) wouldn't be dispensed until the new chain was longer than the original ... so by the time it is detected it is too late.
You can't do it instantly, the attacker have to recreate all the confirmed blocks. If the sum is so large, that you are afraid of double spend - than wait for enough blocks. E.g. 6 blocks = 2 hours with 50% of network.
In my opinion, monitoring for such block forks is much more important, than trying to impose cartel agreement of not having more than 50% on pool operators. If we could have such warning in clients, than it would be even better. Maybe such monitoring service should provide the API and charge a small use fee?
Veldy, if two pools can collude, than so can three, four and more. This risk is inherent to bitcoin design. The only solution to this problem is monitoring and notifying miners in case when pools start to double spend.
Re: [~380 Gh/s Mining Pool] INSTANT PAYOUT,+1% with LP! +0.8% for no failed blocks!
it would actually be 10 btc/day - 3% for pool fees.
Actually, it will be less than 3% due to insurance against invalid blocks and long polling.
If bitcoin will be a success (e.g. 10% of US economy), than i think it will demonetize gold relatively quickly, so gold's price will be around industrial use price. This is the same effect, that happened to silver in 19-20th century.