I guess in your specific code, if a weak or repeated nonce is used, an attacker can compute it from values and recover the private key. This is a well-known vulnerability in ECDSA when nonces are not generated securely.
However, Bitcoin does not use a random nonce for signing transactions. Instead, it employs RFC 6979, which ensures that the nonce is deterministically derived from the private key and the message hash. This prevents reuse and eliminates the risk of private key leakage due to nonce repetition or poor randomness.
If someone claims to have derived the private key from , they likely exploited a flawed nonce generation process. To verify this, one would need multiple signatures using the same nonce or a predictable nonce pattern. In Bitcoin, this should never happen under normal circumstances.
Can you share your code, so i want to check.
First of all, I'd like to say that I have a different account on the forum, and I'm creating this one just to stay anonymous.
I know how this sounds. but here me out.
All i need is one of you to generate a public key with a private key which is below 200 bits (just to note, I already done this method on 256 bit keys. I didn't touch any funds).
Sign at least two messages with that public key.
Include your bitcointalk username in one of them.
The more signatures you provide the faster it'll take my computer to compute it.
10 is well more than enough.
I also have a script to generate these, if you want to save time on that, but i recommend not trusting what i say and write your own script.
Edit: when you send the signatures, send them in this format:
R = 0xHexValue
S = 0xHexValue
Z = 0xHexValue
Note: both the nonce and the private key needs to be below 200 bits.