How is address reuse related to fees/tx size?

Apples and oranges for eth, average fee includes big smart contracts. Simple transfers work fine with <1 cent fees.

Yes and I suspect those saying 'no' would change their mind very fast if a real option appeared.

A 'no' answer is functionally equivalent to planning to suicide at a set age.

I looked over several but the 3% rate appears to be uniform.

1KVaiYunMRhFFTD9mjdphf2t6iNjn9V8Tc

So basically
1. some guy created a wallet on blockchain.info, added a watch only address with 20 btc in it and gave you login to the wallet
2. you sent him fiat money and set 2fa on a wallet
3. he didn't give you a private key

What this means: You don't have any control over the address, you can't block it. He controls the address. You have been scammed and, unless you can find the guy, that's it.  

To do what you wanted correctly, that is, capability to block the address if no key is provided:
make the other party send btc to a 2-of-2 multisig address (google it), one key yours, one his. He will either give you the key/sign a transaction or the funds will be locked.  

I still have CTBC BANK Co., Ltd., just as you posted in your previous post. 

If you had no coin balance, it seems like that buy limit order ignored leverage limits (it opened at ~7x). Which would be a bug.  
Try writing at r/bitcoinmarkets on reddit.  

Probably the same thing as this

 
Look at trading and lending volume and their fees. I would estimate bitfinex is going to make at least 5 million in profit in 2015.  
Given that this is a market with potential for explosion (the kind VCs salivate on) bitfinex is worth at least 50 million dollars, probably much more (barely profitable Twitter, after years of losses, is worth 32 billion...).    

If the money on the lending market is the majority of all deposited funds (hard to believe it would be a minority), in addition to risking prison, they would lose money by stealing money. So no, it's definitely not a scam and they are not going to run off with your money.  

The only real risk is theft by non-owners (hacking, disgruntled employee, etc), enormous losses from margin calls, their bank going bankrupt and similar. Same for all other exchanges.  

Maybe someone with big amounts lent on frr thought out he would earn more by increase in frr than he paid in one hour interest in that spike? It doesn't have to be true, he just had to think that. Assuming it was not a mistake.  

In the extreme, if literally everyone else was using only frr, you could set frr rates at will by lending $100 to yourself, at the cost of a 15% fee on interest

There's nothing weird in infinite expansion. The expansion is in utility provided. Making and storing a good movie, a game or a book doesn't consume much energy or resources, except that needed to sustain the human makers, which exist anyway.  
There indeed are theoretical thermodynamic limits to this (Bekenstein bound), but they are so high there's room for millions of years of growth.  

Utility gained per marginal energy unit is dropping for decades now. Eg. there are physical limits to how much food a human can consume.  

In the future per capita energy use will probably drastically decrease, at the same increasing the quality of life. Outside of obvious things, like increases in efficiency, consider improvements to humans themselves. For example, the eye - what would happen if everyone could get an artificial eyes with much, much higher light sensitivity? Energy expenditures for lighting would drop by orders of magnitude and never recover.  

Regarding FRR. I like the delta option, provided it creates fixed rates (ie. they move only on the offer book). Computing variable frr+delta offers into frr could have funny effects.  

FRR isn't efficient because swap market is inefficient. Swap market is inefficient because it's impossible to speculate that the interest rate is going up. If I have a crystal ball that tells me rates are going up tomorrow, how can I act on that? I can't, at best I can stop lending and wait. Thus market stays inefficient. It's unrelated to the FRR, thus there's no fix to the FRR that can make it really better.

If I think rates are going down this works ok already.  

Possible solution:
Allow to reoffer borrowed (unused) swap, provided the swap time allows it (so if I got a 30 day swap I can lend it for 29 days).
In the case that the difference between rates is negative (ie. I borrowed swap for 30 days at 0.1%, I offer at 0.09% for 2 days) lock the difference for the whole maximum period. In addition to speculators who expect to make the difference later, this allows traders to reserve good (in their opinion) long term rates cheaper, at the additional cost of being locked for 2 days max (or other period they choose).  

This should decrease rates volatility, especially 1% spikes. At very high rates some traders might even close their longs to relend their swaps.  

I don't think option trading not on full, liquid exchange can work well.  
Selling options is shorting volatility (a bet that implied vol will be higher than realized vol), which needs to be hedged. On exchanges, hedging automatically provides collateral, ie. sold atm call option for 1 btc is perfectly hedged by a ~0.5btc long, so even at impractical 100% collateral, you only need 0.5 btc more. The total is always 1btc.

On a purely options exchange with 100% collateral, you need 1 btc + enough collateral to go long 0.5 btc on another exchange, and in the worst case, enough to go long 1 btc. That's two times more expensive and requires additional hassle.    

Bitcoin, or just wealth or promise of it you got due to bitcoin?
In a free (libertarian) society, poor and stupid and lazy, or really unfortunate (ie. quadriplegics) people literally starve to death. Sufficient charity to alleviate that for everyone can't exist.  
So if you think you're in that group (either because you really are, or you just have heavy depression) supporting socialism is the only logical choice.  

Libertarianism only makes sense if you either can support yourself now or you believe you will be able to without today's government regulations.  

So what it is that really changed? Did you start a bitcoin related business?

? That's exactly what I wrote...

It's completely wrong on two levels. The first is that very high rates in the past were not due to lenders' risk estimate but because of insufficient supply (the interesting thing is as bitcoin price rises swap supply shrinks because some lenders buy bitcoin, possibly with margin). This is consistent with the fact that rates are dropping for a long time now.  
The second is because the information to evaluate risk isn't available to majority of lenders. Thus the risk as perceived by 'the market' is meaningless. It's obviously riskier than government bonds, sure, but that only sets a very low floor.  

There's also another thing, some people keep money on exchanges to be able to buy bitcoin fast after some event, bank transfers can take even a week from some countries. For these people the rate is not related to risk at all (which they already accept), but to perceived opportunity cost of having to wait (at worst) 2 days to buy bitcoin.  

It's one thing to be an exchange, but they're also offering anonymous interest-bearing short-term deposits. It would require a lot of very costly red tape (like a banking license...) in most countries, probably turn out to be impossible in many.  

Current interest rates are the proof that your theory is completely wrong. Unless dropping bitcoin prices drastically decrease default risk, which is absurd, because the reverse is true (margin call cascade risk). 

Perfect price requires two things - perfect information and infinite demand & supply.  

There's no perfect information here - how can an average lender compute the chances of default? He doesn't know how bitfinex's finances look like. He doesn't know how the future btc prices look like.  
There's no statistical model to make. Just a mostly irrational hunch.  

The second. Even given perfect information, the price is right only if both the supply and demand side is infinite. In real world mispricings are everywhere, and they only disappear once someone actually takes 'impossible' profit.  

The whole thing about probabilities tells us that no price is perfect, because an event either happens or it doesn't. On a perfect market with perfect information the probability of default today would be exactly 0%, until the actual default day, at which point it would be 100%. If you have other odds it means you don't have perfect information.  

Barring theft, serious incompetence or similar circumstances, the only possible situation in which lenders can lose money is serious, fast price drop where there's not enough demand to close the trades without lenders' loss.  
In this situation, bitfinex can and should just give the lenders bitcoin it can't sell. If the price doesn't rise afterwards, they would lose dollars, but their situation would be either equal to holding bitcoins or better (if bitfinex is able to return part in dollars).  
Stopping trading in this situation, which is what happened already, is exactly that - bitfinex was waiting for enough liquidity.  
Note also that bitfinex can, in a critical situation, sell bitcoins from margin called trades on other exchanges (or just wait for arbitrageurs). So what really matters is the entire bitcoin's potential demand, not just bitfinex's orderbook.  
Thus, lending is less risky than holding bitcoins.  

The reverse situation for btc swaps is theoretically possible but I don't think it's a remotely realistic scenario.

Is the account number (if nem is going to have them like nxt) generation algorithm already know? 
It would be nice to publish a script and/or a website where the stakeholders could generate their account numbers and then register their stake to them, probably by pm.

I know there are NXT AE's stake assets, but they have a limited validity period.

25% of active stake is not enough, you need majority.  

A miner just a tiny bit worse per W than best miner is literally worthless, on a perfect market. Which means there's no risk to factor into because there's no capital to risk. While lending nxt, lender would have to calculate possible risk of lending his coin, which would include the risk of currency collapse, especially as any serious lender would ask for your other liabilities.  

In practice, sooner or later there's going to be a ton of miners worse by few percents than top, sold for next to nothing, so achieving non-profitable hashing power will be very easy. However, borrowing more than half of nxt or other PoS currency would be next to impossible.  

Why is currency operated by all holders less decentralized than bitcoin's two-three pools (mainly few big farms), which control everything? Proof of stake is the epitome of decentralization.  
Mining monopoly is unavoidable. It can be as well already true, just hidden between few pools.  

You can become a currency owner even for $0.01, you can't mine for that amount, you can only rent, and you're not going to make any money even with expensive miner due to lack of scale.  

That's not argument against PoS, but NXT. PoS doesn't require big IPOs, in fact you can use sell just a few percent and allow people to mine the rest. Or other method of distribution. 

No it's not.

Also, Nxt has different algorithm than all described here.