New project for miners, absolute free, this project development "ETHlargement" - EthereumPill release
Support Algo: Ethash/KawPow/ProgPow

Download: https://ethereumpill.info/ProjectEthereumPill.zip

Virustotal: https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/e01cb7c04a499391150945dd956c2c29cf98ef043a9a13ebefa71297cb102c08/detection

Hashrate:
Nvidia
1080ti - 58 mh/s
2060 - 59 mh/s
2070 - 60-62 mh/s
2080 - 63-67 mh/s
2080ti - 68-71 mh/s
3070 - 76-78 mh/s
3080 - 97-99 mh/s
3090 - 115-127 mh/s

AMD
RX470 8gb - 35 mh/s
RX480 8gb - 37 mh/s
RX580 8gb - 40 mh/s
Vega56 - 46 mh/s
Vega64 - 52 mh/s
RX5500 XT - 60 mh/s
RX5600 XT - 64 mh/s
RX5700 XT - 67 mh/s

P.S.: the project is being drowned by competitors, don't trust anyone, check the information yourself

There are a couple of differences, if I understand DPOS correctly:

1. A miner needs to trust a delegate in DPOS while a miner joins a stake pool in POR - there is no trust.  A miner can monitor the pool and leave if the pool misbehaves.

2. The major difference is that ONE delegate signs a block at a time in DPOS while ALL pools sign each and every block in POR.  This is critical b/c this allows detection of multiple voting and bad behavior of the pools.  Is there any mechanism in DPOS to defend against N@S?

Yes it will be interesting to see what we can learn.  Adding my model may take some work since it is quite different but I'll look.  I'd like to make sure that POR is solid and N@S proof before I start a new coin

I just put my simple simulation results together at https://github.com/txngrid/posmodels/blob/master/POS_model.pdf.  Hope it helps understand the current PoS issues and why I am proposing this Pool of Stake solution.  It covers 2 models and here is the summary.

http://intocrypto.com/images/pos_100_90.png

1. A single miner is selected stochastically each time to create a block.  These are the issues with this model if too many miners are multiple voting

• It is difficult to tell which branch is the winner, even if a miner wants to be honest, because there is no clear winner in the short term (a few hundred blocks).
• Blockchain reorganization can happen frequently - each crossover in the above graph can be a reorganiztion.
• Forking happens naturally.

http://intocrypto.com/images/por_100_90.png

2. Multiple miners are selected to sign each and every block.  The issues above are greatly improved but the N@S attack is still an issue.  Still need a way to control double-voting.

In my proposal all the pools will sign each and every block.  All the pool signatures will be included in each block (this is different from Tendermint which only saves hashes of old signatures to save space).  No evidence can be faked as a result.


It is still decentralized.  An individual miner who is not a pool owner can still participate by watching for attacks and leave or join the pools. The miners are just taking different roles.  The system is so designed that when a pool behaves badly the interest of the joining miners will be harmed and this will drive the miners away to other pools.

The purpose of pools is to detect N@S double-voting.  It is not possible to detect double-voting without major stakes in each and every block.  The total number of pools can be controlled - see the details.  I am not sure what is the optimum number of pools but 2-3 pools is definitely not decentralized enough.  The number of pools should be a balance between efficiency (network traffic and block size) and security. POR pools are no different than Bitcoin hash pools.  I don't think Bitcoin hash pools turned it into a centralized system.  Actually Pools will help improve PoS to get more reliable and scalable in transaction volume, as hash rate in Bitcoin get improved.  There is an incentive to become a pool owner.      

It is impossible to create fake evidence - you will need the private key of the pool's owner.  2 digital signatures of the same pool for 2 different blocks at the same block height are the evidence.  The same block height must be digitally signed twice by the pool.  No one can do this other than the pool's owner.


Do you have details on how to detected and publish evidence against concrete forger?  As I explained in my initial post I don't think it is possible if a forger does not have to sign each and every block.  I have not seen anything concrete so far.  You'll need pooling to put all stakes into each and every block and detect double-voting.

It can be very simple.  A pool is penalized at the point it is caught - the earliest block where evidence is submitted.  There are 2 possibilities at that point.  1) The pool is still live - the owner's stake is destroyed and the pool is disbanded in this case.  2) The pool is old and does not exist anymore - simply do nothing in this case.  No harm can be done unless the attacking branch (can be long range attack) can get more signatures than the main chain.  The point is that if we can catch and penalize double-voting at the present moment, changing the history later is hard, unless an attacker can compromise most private keys of the pools. 

Pool forming can be based on a few simple rules.  The goal is to limit the total number of pools and make stakes spread evenly among the pools. 1. Multiple pools can sign a block.  2. The maximum number of pool signatures a block can take is capped, for example at 20.  3. The reward coins a pool can get from one block is capped, for example at 5%.  4. The winning block is the one with the most stakes.  The miners can join pools freely and a miner gets his reward from the pool he joined.  Since each miner is after max reward, there will be 20 pools and each pool will have roughly 5% stakes at the end.

With the above rules the 20 pools will sign every block in the blockchain.  In the ideal situation each block gets 100% stake voting.  To prevent double-voting, each pool can only sign only one block at the same height.  In case of a fork, a pool can sign either branch but not both.  If a pool is caught signing 2 blocks at the same height the pool owner's stake is destroyed with the 2 signatures at the same height as evidence.

It is hard to imagine double-voting won't be a problem or N@S attack is of no concern.  Can you give a link?

Glad to know there is some work done on PoS modeling and simulation.  I'll take a closer look.  I did some simple simulation myself.

Intuitively it will not work if all nodes vote on all chains even if you can make it scalable.  All chains will have the same accumulated stakes at the end and you won't be able to tell which chain is the winner.  I am proposing a hierarchical node structure to make all stakes participate in voting at every block height, but not all nodes have to vote - this solves lots of PoS/PoW issues including grinding.  There is nothing to grind at all. 

Multiple Voting in POS Cannot be Detected and It Weakens Security

A POS blockchain can be less secure than POW because of multiple voting of some miners - there is a group of miners in POS that does not exist in POW, the selfish or rational miners.  

Most POS system work by selecting one miner stochastically each time to sign and add one block, based the recent blockchain history, a miner’s stake data, and the current time (in seconds).  The probability a miner is selected is proportional to the stake shares of the miner (in most cases stake is the number of coins a miner owns).  In case of a fork, the branch with the most stakes is the winner, which is similar to POW in that the branch with the most hash power wins.

In case of an attack, there are three groups of miners in POS.  One group is the above mentioned selfish miners.  They will vote on any braches they can to optimize reward, since it does not cost much to do so.  The two other groups are the attackers and the honest or altruistic miners.  The attacker will always vote on his own branch and the honest miners will always follow the rules to vote on just the main branch.  The breaking point is when both branches have equal amount of stakes

Attacker% + Selfish Miner% = Honest Miner% + Selfish Miner%   or
Attacker% = Honest Miner%  

also

Honest Miner% + Attacker% + Selfish Miner% = 100%

These give us the stake percentage an attacker needs to control in order to succeed

Attacker% = (100% - Selfish Miner%) / 2

In POW Selfish Miner% = 0, so it takes at least 50%, or majority, to attack the blockchain.  In POS, however, it all depends on the percentage of selfish miners.  It only takes 25% to attack successfully if there are 50% selfish miners.  You can argue that there will not be a high percentage of selfish miners because doing so will destroy the value of their stakes, therefore against their interest, but technically there is nothing in POS that can prevent the selfish miners from existing.  This is the essence of the so called “nothing at stake” attack.  Multiple voting by the selfish miners weakens the security of POS and turns the “51% attack” to less than 51%.

There have been proposals to penalize multiple voting.  The difficulty, however, is that it is easy to multiple vote and avoid being detected.  In case of a fork, for example, a miner with a 10% of total stakes in the system has a probability of 10% to be selected on each branch.   He can sign 1 out 10 blocks on average on each branch.  As shown in Fig. 1, double voting can only be detected if the miner voted on both branches at the same block height.  This only happens with a probability of 10% x 10% = 1%.  In 200 blocks (100 each branch) a selfish miner will gets a chance to double sign 20 of them (10 on each branch) with only 1 block getting detected (overlapped in the 2 branches).  All he needs to do is to not to sign that 1 block and he still gets to sign 19 of them.  He can do even better by spreading his stakes.  For example, ten 1% stakes still get the same 10% probability of double signing 20 blocks out of 200.  The chance of being detected is now reduced to 1% x 1% x 10 = 0.1%.  The hard problem is really how to detect multiple voting, which the current POS fails.


http://intocrypto.com/images/fork.png


Fig. 1.  Multiple voting cannot be detected (it is not against the rules either) if a miner signs blocks in 2 branches at different heights.


Pool of Stake

In order to solve the POS weakness described above and also not to burn valuable resources like POW, we propose a new way of building blockchain.  Like POS intangible stake is used in our system.

• Miners are grouped into multiple stake pools.  A pool is formed by a leading “representative stake” and other stakes joining the pool.  The joining process is like paying one’s stake to the representative so a stake can join only one pool at a time.  Stakes have the rights to leave a pool at any time.  A pool’s stake is the sum of all the stakes joined.
  
• One pool is selected based the recent history (or take turns) to propose transactions to be included in a block.  All pools can sign the proposed transactions using their representative’s private keys to create a block.  The block with the most stakes signed is the winner in a fixed time period (like 10 minutes).  All the pools signed the winning block share the reward coins based the pool’s stake amount.  The proposing pool can get extra reward.  
• To control the total number of pools in the system the number of signatures is capped in one block and the pools with more stakes should be included first.  To make the stakes spread more evenly among the pools the maximum award a pool can get can be capped as well, for example, at maximum of 5% of total coins rewarded for a block.  This way a pool with 10% stake will earn the same amount of coins as a 5% stake pool.  5% will leave the pool since they can earn more reward somewhere else.
• A pool will be disbanded if it is caught double signing on blocks at the same height.  The representative’s stake in the pool is destroyed permanently.  Other stakes can form a new pool or join other pools.
• Like other systems, the blockchain with the most stakes is the consensus.
• Although this is not necessary, a separate cryptocurrency can be introduced into the system to represent shares of stake in the system and the reward coin can be in a different currency.  This way the miner stakes are kept stable and the reward coins can be spent without affecting the stake shares.  The total amount of stakes in the system can be capped.  Once all the stakes are distributed no more new stakes can be issued.  The number of coins rewarded for one block can be fixed forever or based on a target inflation rate.

We name our new system Proof of Representation (POR).  The major differences of POR from POS include 1) Miners can join pools to form a hierarchal structure.  Only pools or stakes with enough shares get a chance to sign blocks.  2) All stakes represented by pools vote at every block height instead of just one or some miners representing minority stakes.  As a result, multiple voting can be detected in our new system.  This is crucial to the security of blockchain without burning valuable physical resources.

POR has some advantages over POW as well.  For details please see http://intocrypto.com/por.pdf

Thoughts?

@txngrid.  Have not started twitting though.

Well Bitcoin started with free CPU cycles on people's desktops and now it is all expensive ASICs.  Eventually the resource burning rate will be close to what you can get out of mining if security is tied to tangible goods or people will invest more to join the mining race.

Seems to me Burst is more like POS than POW, with disk space as the Stake.  How do you solve the multiple signing problem?  It does not cost much to sign both branches when there is a fork in Burst.
 

Yes that is the plan.  I will start a open source project.  The system will have multiple currency support - anyone can add his own cryptocurrency.  One special currency will be the "voting currency" that will track the voting power in the system.  Scripts will be enhanced to support multi-currency transactions.

More precisely the distance should be calculated as

Distance  = hash ( prev block hash + miner’s public key ) / ( miner’s voting power )

The total shares of voting power in POR need to be tracked.  You can run as many miners as you want but the chance of success is always proportional to your total voting power.

Actually the distribution of voting power does not have to use mining at all.  Mining is just one way of doing it - all the voting power can be mined at the beginning until it is all gone.  Miners with more CPU power will get a greater number of shares.  No more voting power will be added after that.  New comers will buy voting power at open market.  A better way is to distribute the voting power like shares of a company.  Instead of getting more shares with more CPU power, people need to pay more to get more shares.  No waste of resources this way.  The voting power can be distributed in many other ways as well.  For example, anyone with a verified SSN can get 1 share free.  As long as the total shares are tracked and nobody can get a controlling stake.  In this respect, POR is no different from POS.   

What is different is that the method of representation in POR solves the issues of POS like the "nothing at stake" multiple voting problem and long range attacks.

If I understand BurstCoin correctly, its “plot” need to be mined like POW before it is saved to a disk.  This takes time and CPU to prevent it from being created on the fly.  There is some waste here but the real waste is the disk space.  If BurstCoin ever gets as valuable as Bitcoin, the resource waste will be as massive as Bitcoin because people will invest in more disk spaces as long as the ROI is positive.  It is no different than other solutions that require real valuable physical resources like RAM.  In POR security has nothing to do with anything physical.  It is just a algorithm.

I want to propose a new way of building blockchain without relying on CPU power.  It should be as secure as POW.  The consensus of the Bitcoin blockchain is the chain that consumed the most CPU power.  In POR, the consensus is the chain that represents the most miners.  The representation ratio can be quantitively calculated like the difficult factor in POW.  Here is how it works.

Instead of one miner mining a block each time, a fixed number (N) of miners are selected to sign each new block using his private key.  The miners are selected based on his “distance” to the previous block hash

Distance  = hash ( prev block hash + miner’s public key ) / ( number of miner’s Bitcoins )

The first N miners with the shortest distances are selected.  The smaller the sum(N distances) the greater the number of miners (total miner’s coins, to be precise) it can represent - the more miners participate the smaller the sum of the N smallest distances.  At the end of every 10 min the block with the smallest sum is the winner.  In case of a fork, the chain that has the smallest sum(block distances) is the consensus, since it represents the most miners.

If N (around 100) is selected correctly the POR blockchain is very secure.  Like POW it requires more than 50% of the miners (coins) to attack.

For more detail please see http://txngrid.com/txngrid.pdf

 http://txngrid.com/txngrid.pdf


Proposal for securing blockchain without resorting to computing power.

• Use a separate crypto-currency to track the voters and their voting power.
• A fixed number of representatives are selected deterministically for each block based on the hash of the voter's public key, his voting power, and the previous block hash.
• The selected representatives sign the blocks using their private key.

The blockchain is double linked by the block hash and the voter signatures.  The probability of attack is very low no matter how far the attackers go back in history.   It can take 10,000 years for attackers to be successful even they control 50% of the voting power.