Considering your own property rights and those of others, which is more important to end, or perhaps you draw no such distinction, or else they are too evenly matched to choose one over the other?

Would you say that you own your own body?

Do you see any danger of abandoning something precious when it is embedded or intertwined with something onerous?

If it were widely regarded as unacceptable to cause suffering for the purpose of protecting property rights, would you then see value in the tradition?

What is the significance to the tradition of property rights of the distinction Eisenstein draws between money and all other goods?

Baudrillard presents hyperreality as the terminal stage of simulation, where a sign or image has no relation to any reality whatsoever, but is “its own pure simulacrum” (Baudrillard 1994, 6). The real, he says, has become an operational effect of symbolic processes, just as images are technologically generated and coded before we actually perceive them. This means technological mediation has usurped the productive role of the Kantian subject, the locus of an original synthesis of concepts and intuitions, as well as the Marxian worker, the producer of capital though labor, and the Freudian unconscious, the mechanism of repression and desire. “From now on,” says Baudrillard, “signs are exchanged against each other rather than against the real” (Baudrillard 1993, 7), so production now means signs producing other signs. The system of symbolic exchange is therefore no longer real but “hyperreal.” Where the real is “that of which it is possible to provide an equivalent reproduction,” the hyperreal, says Baudrillard, is “that which is always already reproduced” (Baudrillard 1993, 73). The hyperreal is a system of simulation simulating itself.