Quote from: majamina on March 27, 2015, 08:58:18 PM

Quote from: ArticMine on March 27, 2015, 08:45:24 PM

Quote from: majamina on March 27, 2015, 08:14:11 PM

Quote

This assumes that one un-compromised round of Darksend is enough.

Enough for what? Could you elaborate please?

The problem is that this will not work with a partially compromised masternode network. I could very likely still end up with and effective Darksend of 1 round.

I'm trying to get my head round this Cheesy

While I keep trying, maybe you could illustrate with an example of some kind.

Let us say I face an attack that will work against 1 round of Darksend but will fail against 2 rounds of Darksend. This could be the Sybil example I quoted above. If the attacker has also partially compromised the masternode network, then I need a sequence of 2 un-compromised Darksend rounds for protection from this attack. In this example sequence 1 will not work

1) Honest Malicious Honest Malicious Honest Malicious

but sequence 2 will work

2) Malicious Honest Honest Malicious Malicious Honest

because of the bold part. So it is the probability of the sequence of n honest masternodes in the chain that matters, and this is much lower than the probability of a single honest masternode in the chain.