Quote from: gmaxwell on May 02, 2015, 07:50:44 PM

Quote from: EliptiBox on May 02, 2015, 05:16:02 PM

We have just the solution for this problem - firewall between the crypto controller and the interface, implemented directly in silicon:
http://www.eliptibox.com/#!Hardware-Firewall-for-Hardware-Wallet/cw4e/54ecb8670cf27a657a44c314
EliptiBox Team
www.eliptibox.com

You are spamming; advertising your product is off-topic for this thread, doubly so since its already been spamvertised once here; but since you've been so bold-- I inquired and found out that your product is based off the same weak, barely tested/reviewed, and slow as heck naive cryptographic code used in the product being discussed here. The information leak here is so severe that I am very doubtful that your (quite laudable) improved hardware isolation can prevent-- e.g. the code in question leaks several bits of information about the key from just the time it takes.

Furthermore, Your "directly in silicon" is an FPGA with a loading procedure 'under the seal', this is potentially yet another back door vector, it sinks a lot of power, and really seems to be of dubious value. I would have preferably seen all the external interfaces over simple low-ish-speed serial interfaces with good electrical isolation, rather than a huge power sucking FPGA under the secure-area can. Use of a BGA probably also means you need a 4 layer board for signals routing and thus probably can't use an extra layer as a separate ground to complete the shield can. The FPGA just seems like a costly gimmick to me, and that you're misrepresenting this as a solution to bad cryptographic code (which you have made a similar failure by selecting to use it) doesn't bode well for the security of your product.

Thank you for raising important issues. To refrain from spamming, the following prior link discusses the technical points raised here:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=970998.msg11295854#msg11295854

EliptiBox Team