Quote from: oaxaca on July 20, 2015, 07:55:06 PM

Quote from: kazuki49 on July 20, 2015, 07:48:39 PM

So you want Peter Todd tell you the formula of your own snake-oil? It's a snake-oil. Wink

I'm impressed by your thorough analysis. Your points are articulate and well laid out.

I'm still waiting for you to refute this (I'm no Peter Todd, but it seems kind of a big security lapse and it can warm you up for when Todd shows up):

Quote from: generalizethis on July 20, 2015, 02:24:56 PM

Quote from: generalizethis on July 19, 2015, 09:40:29 PM

Quote from: illodin on July 19, 2015, 09:27:44 PM

Quote from: generalizethis on July 19, 2015, 09:15:31 PM

Quote from: TanteStefana2 on July 19, 2015, 09:05:51 PM

I don't trust this system. I can't see it and verify it. What good is it for everything to be hidden completely, to the point where you have to trust that it is working?

With a simple, understandable system that fully protects the privacy of the user, yet requires no trust - as was always the whole point of the decentralized crypto currency of Bitcoin - DASH is not more superior due to it's complexity, but due to it's simplicity. If you're such a technocrat that you don't understand this, I can only feel bad for you because the majority of the world will.

LOL. Here's the attack vector Evan created out of ignorance, stupidity or pure not giving a fuck.

The easiest attack is to buy masternodes and ddos attack competing nodes until you own the traffic. Evan claims it's financially implausible, but ignores that nodes are most profitable when there about a 1,000 masternodes (he has a ROI graphic on the dash BCT thread that underscores this). He also ignores that the attacker would be pulling incomes from these masternodes--given that most are held on corporate servers underlies that no one knows who owns them outside of the host and the owner. He also ignores how motivated an attacker may be, that he or another masternode operator might comply given the right circumstances (threat or lawful compliance) and how deep LE's pockets are--silly, dangerous, stupid.

If you trust that system knowing the flaws, you deserve whatever comes your way--except maybe being linked to pedophiles--can you show that link on your explorer?

DOS'ing masternodes doesn't reduce the anonymity set of the transactions or coins mixed before the DOS. If the masternode count drops 50% for example all of a sudden, mixing coins at that moment is not a good idea. It was already suggested a year ago or so that the wallet would take care of this and protect the user during the network downtime. It hasn't been implemented yet afaik, DASH must grow at least 100x at minimum before this (an appearance of such a motivated attacker) would become even a possibility.

DDOS is to control the majority of nodes, not to directly reduce the anonymity set--though by doing so while monitoring the nodes you posses would break anonymity--which was my point. Nice suggestion, but wouldn't an attacker take control of the nodes before any measures were taken, while it was cheapest, and while they could gain the most info for the longest time without raising any red flags? Also, you still have no measure in reality or in the works to stop an organization from using coercion or compliance to motivate a node operator to turn over data--this is even better since the whatevermine granted the first users such a large stash of coins and the masternodes are most likely concentrated in a few hands. But here's the big problem: masternodes are human controlled intermediaries that perform important functions. Whatever breaks dash's anonymity will happen because you trust this moronic system that is begging to be broken. You are playing a game of whack-a-mole and apparently no one in dashland has the theoretical capability to see it or the moral compass to speak up. Snake oil.