Quote from: Come-from-Beyond on October 21, 2015, 09:34:21 PM

Quote from: monsterer on October 21, 2015, 09:14:38 PM

Are you going to produce a whitepaper?

Yes, you can see the draft here - http://188.138.57.93/tangle.pdf.

I'm working on a similar DAG based design and it was interesting to read your whitepaper. A few questions/concerns:

1. Could you explain in layman's terms, why capping the amount of work per transaction makes double-spend attacks less likely to succeed? It doesn't sound intuitive.

2. What is the incentive for honest nodes to keep PoW on the legit sub-tangle high enough, so that no single attacker (even ASIC-powered one) can create a fake sub-tangle that has higher cumulative weight and contains his doublespend?

3. The whitepaper says that the subtangle that contains a failed doublespend is discarded. Does it mean that all other transactions that happened to approve the doublespend transaction are also discarded? If so, an attacker would try to inject two conflicting transactions at nearly the same time. Since synchronization is not instantaneous, some users will unknowingly approve one of these two transactions before they learn about the other. If they were unlucky to approve the transaction that eventually dies, their own transactions are also discarded, correct? Then it sounds like poor user experience, since user's transaction can be effectively canceled for reasons that he doesn't control. Next, if the attacker continuously sends penny doublespend transactions, he will split the network into multiple branches, most of them will be discarded, and the network will be effectively stalled. This is DoS attack. Next, observe that when a subtangle is discarded, the PoW invested in its creation is also discarded. Then if the attacker tries to doublespend a more sizable amount at the same time, he will reduce the hashpower of the honest part of the network by DoSing it this way, and he will need less resources to produce a subtangle that overweighs this weak legitimate subtangle.